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Bound by necessity rather than trust, these former foes now walk a delicate line—one that could check Abiy Ahmed’s aggression or plunge the Horn into another devastating war.
In the volatile arena of Horn of Africa geopolitics, Tigray has reemerged as the epicenter of a precarious power shift. The recent thawing of relations between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Eritrea—whose regime waged a genocidal war against Tigrayans just three years ago—is no longer a political charade.
Dubbed “Tsimdo,” this uneasy alliance reflects a profound recalibration driven by mutual desperation: Tigray, sidelined by the collapse of the Pretoria Agreement, is fighting for survival; Eritrea, haunted by fears of Ethiopian expansionism, seeks a strategic buffer.
For Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, whose strategy of encircling Tigray is now unraveling, the stakes are immense. While this realignment may act as a short-term deterrent, it also risks plunging Tigray once more into war—one that Abiy has warned could be even deadlier than the 2020–2022 conflict.
Two and a half years after it was signed, the Pretoria deal that silenced the guns has yet to be fully implemented. Despite Tigray handing over most of its heavy weapons and demobilizing a large portion of its army, around a million people remain displaced, and tens of thousands of refugees have still not been able to return home.
Amhara and Eritrean forces continue to commit abuses and forcibly displace civilians with impunity in the areas they still occupy. To complicate matters further, on 14 May, Ethiopia’s National Election Board revoked TPLF’s legal status, effectively banning it from politics and, ipso facto, rendering the Pretoria Agreement null and void.
Echoing the buildup to the previous war, Ethiopia has resumed its blockade of fuel and commercial supplies to Tigray, paralyzing essential services and deepening the humanitarian crisis. Access for journalists and foreign diplomats to the region has also been severely restricted.
Fractured Loyalties
Tigray’s once-unmatched unity, which helped it endure a brutal war, is now fracturing amid internal power struggles. Both TPLF factions share responsibility for failing to implement the Pretoria Agreement, prioritizing political rivalry over the region’s urgent needs.
Debretsion Gebremichael’s camp accuses Getachew Reda’s interim administration of mishandling key issues like displaced persons’ return, the withdrawal of Eritrean and Amhara forces, and stalled elections. Meanwhile, Getachew’s faction presents itself as reformist, accusing Debretsion of blocking progress.
After the leadership split in March, Getachew was forced out and appointed Prime Minister Abiy’s advisor on East African affairs, while his loyalists began organizing the Tigray Peace Force (TPF) in neighboring Afar.
This military wing—led by General Gebregziabher Beyene—is reportedly receiving training, funding, and close logistical support from the federal government and its Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF). Their ultimate objective being to dislodge the TPLF from power and dismantle the Tigray Defense Forces, effectively neutralizing any organized military or political resistance to federal control, aligning squarely with Abiy’s strategic interests.
By embracing the narratives of Abiy’s Prosperity Party, Getachew has transformed into the internal threat Tigray once feared from the outside. In an apparent bid to appease Abiy, he went so far as to say, “We believe the people of Wolkait and Tsegede have a legitimate identity question,” effectively legitimizing the ethnic cleansing of Western Tigray and its subsequent occupation.
Although, for many, the TPLF was—and still is—more than a political party, the absence of a peace dividend following a devastating war that claimed nearly a million lives has severely damaged its legitimacy.
Over the past four years, both factions have revealed themselves as a venal elite, seemingly willing to betray the people of Tigray to protect their own interests. Such is the level of political decay that, under federal backing, the Getachew-led TPF fighters have begun attacking the very army that defends Tigray.
Status Signaling
Status signaling in international politics refers to how states communicate their perceived position to other actors. It’s a strategic form of communication, often involving symbolic actions and rhetoric, aimed at shaping how other states view their power, legitimacy, and intentions. The blockades, troop movements, parades, and escalating rhetoric—including accusations and counter-accusations—by Ethiopia, Tigray, and Eritrea partly serve to signal their strategic intentions to one another and to the international community.
The TPLF has begun signaling its willingness to align with Eritrea against the federal government—an unholy alliance. Encumbered by longstanding mistrust between Tigray and its historic adversary, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, Tsimdo has thus far remained largely symbolic and rhetorical.
On 4 June, TPLF leaders, reportedly led by party chairman Debretsion, launched the construction of a new road linking the town of Ahse’a in Adwa to Eritrea, signaling their intentions to normalize relations with the totalitarian state.
But if one looks past the rhetoric and token gestures, the hysteria of the Eritrean regime becomes unmistakably apparent. Its concern lies less with confronting Ethiopia itself—a move that could spark another bloody war—and more with the prospect of an ENDF army bolstered, and potentially commanded, by TDF commanders. Such a scenario would pose an existential threat, raising the specter of regime collapse and the potential annexation of Eritrea’s strategic Red Sea ports.
Consequently, enthusiasm for Tsimdo appears strongest on the Eritrean side, with Asmara, according to analysts, dangling promises of support for Tigray’s independence—and, potentially, maritime access for the TDF—as part of a broader strategic recalibration. According to Africa Intelligence, in “an unprecedented confidential meeting in late January in Asmara,” Isaias allegedly “promised TDF officers his protection in the event of conflict with Ethiopia.”
However, from the TPLF’s perspective, Isaias is not—and has never been—a trustworthy ally. Even if those deep-seated mistrusts were somehow overcome, Eritrea’s poor and small economy—coupled with its political isolation—renders it incapable of providing meaningful support to Tigray in the event of renewed conflict with the federal government.
Despite a history of adversarial relations, a tactical alignment between Tigray and Eritrea is not beyond the realm of possibility. The TPLF and Eritrea’s ruling PFDJ (formerly EPLF) have previously united against a shared adversary, making such cooperation not without precedent. In 1982, despite their ideological differences and divergent military strategies, the two collaborated during the Derg regime’s Red Star Campaign, a massive offensive aimed at crushing the EPLF stronghold in Sahel.
Facing existential threats, the EPLF appealed to the TPLF for military support. The TPLF responded not only out of solidarity but also to protect its own survival by weakening a common enemy. Consequently, the TPLF dispatched three brigades to reinforce EPLF trenches in Sahel. Should Abiy continues to escalate further, Ethiopia could come to represent a shared existential threat, forcing a convergence of interests between Mekelle and Asmara, and by extension, with Eritrean-backed Fano forces in the Amhara region.
To the casual observer, neutrality may seem like the safest path for Tigray; avoiding any alliances altogether. Yet, in the ruthless logic of realpolitik, such a stance could prove dangerously naive. If Tigray cannot secure a peaceful understanding with Ethiopia and/or Eritrea, there’s a genuine risk that the two regimes might rekindle their genocidal pact against its people.
The current balance of power in the Horn of Africa hinges on an uneasy triangle: TDF, Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF), and the ENDF. None can unilaterally overpower the other. In such a volatile landscape, it is not ideals but ruthless pragmatism that dictate political calculus.
Uniting Sworn Enemies
One must not forget that Tsimdo stems from the Ethiopian government’s failure to uphold the Pretoria Agreement. While distasteful to many Tigrayans, the TPLF appears to be leveraging it both as a deterrent and a means to boost its bargaining power.
What makes this particularly ironic is that the federal government’s deliberate withdrawal from the Ethio-Eritrean border regions—effectively abandoning Tigray to Eritrean forces to continue to loot, kill civilians, and commit sexual violence against Tigrayan women with impunity—became the very circumstance that enabled this unexpected realignment.
Up until early June 2025—when tensions between Asmara and Addis Ababa boiled over following Isaias’ keynote address marking Eritrea’s 34th independence anniversary—the Ethiopian government had not only refused to acknowledge the presence of Eritrean forces beyond areas assigned by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, but also chose not to call for their withdrawal. However, as the latest signal of this evolving rapprochement, Eritrean troops—stationed in Tigray’s Irob district since 2022 despite repeated objections from Tigray and the international community—reportedly withdrew in May.
From Tigray’s perspective, Tsimdo could serve as a strategic deterrent, primarily by fracturing the genocidal Ethio-Eritrean axis. Yet one could argue that this political dalliance is a deliberate ploy by Asmara to redirect Abiy’s firepower back toward Tigray. It’s important to remember that the Eritrean army poses a greater military threat to Tigray than the ENDF ever has or ever will.
Tsimdo represents a strategic threat to Abiy. Should it evolve into a concrete alliance, it would preclude his capacity to militarily pressure either Eritrea or Tigray. This alliance would also signal a strategic alignment between Tigray and Eritrean-backed Amhara factions, limiting Abiy’s ability to project military power beyond the Abay Gorge.
From Eritrea’s standpoint, this would secure a significant stretch of the 1,033-kilometer border it shares with Ethiopia. Isaias is calculating that if he can lock down Eritrea’s southern frontier with Tigray, the portion bordering Ethiopia’s Afar region would effectively be guarded by the Danakil Depression, a remote, inhospitable expanse known as one of the hottest, lowest, and driest places on Earth. This would allow Eritrea to concentrate its forces on defending the Bure front, a narrow zone approximately 80 kilometers west of Assab, which, according to reports, the regime is fortifying to protect its strategic ports, long coveted by Abiy Ahmed and Ethiopian nationalists.
Despite widespread skepticism, the rumored alliance appears to be the only viable path forward for both Eritrea and, arguably, Tigray. If Tigray instead forms an anti-Eritrea alliance with Ethiopia, as advocated by many in the Getachew camp, Tigray could find itself fighting against not only Eritrea, but also deepening hostilities with Eritrean-backed Amhara forces fighting against the Abiy regime. Such a move could plunge Tigray back into multi-pronged conflict.
Let’s assume, for argument’s sake, that such a coalition triumphs over Eritrea. Abiy’s next mission would likely be the subjugation of Tigray. Strategically, Tigray seeks a friendly government in Asmara—not Eritrea’s absorption into the Ethiopian empire, which may well be Abiy’s ultimate aim. Such a trajectory would undermine Tigray’s autonomy and obstruct any future aspirations for independence.
Perils of Hubris
Conflict, rather than peace, has defined the longest stretch of Ethiopia’s history. Abiy—much like many of his predecessors—subscribes to the belief that all political disputes can be resolved through the barrel of a gun, under the assumption that sheer manpower and firepower guarantee victory. Despite superior manpower and firepower, neither the Derg dictatorship survived nor did Abiy secure the pyrrhic victory he so desperately craved in Tigray.
Yet, driven by hubris, he seems unwilling—or unable—to learn from the failures of the past. In his latest address to parliament, Abiy described the ENDF as “a capable, modern army”. Yet it has struggled to crush insurgencies in Amhara and Oromia, let alone subjugate Tigray or invade a sovereign neighbor, as its commander-in-chief so often threatens.
Upon assuming power in 2018, Abiy initiated a quiet restructuring of the ENDF under the banner of reform, systematically purging nearly all Tigrayan senior and general officers from the army’s high command over a two-year span. Moreover, at the outset of the genocidal war on Tigray, he ordered the arrest of the remaining ethnic Tigrayan soldiers and junior officers in the army.
According to Taye Dendea, a former Minister of Peace and senior member of the ruling Prosperity Party, the 2020 war was deliberately instigated as a pretext to purge ethnic Tigrayans from the Ethiopian national army. This severely weakened the ENDF’s chain of command, as the purged Tigrayan officers were battle-hardened veterans of both the war against the Derg regime and the Ethio-Eritrean border conflict.
Moreover, ethnic Tigrayans made up 60 percent of the army’s technical personnel in artillery and engineering, further eroding the military’s operational capacity. To make matters worse, the two year war depleted the ENDF of nearly all its remaining non-Tigrayan veterans—including both senior and junior officers—who might have served as a vital reserve of experience to replenish losses within the command hierarchy.
Militarily speaking, Tigray maintains a well-organized, battle-hardened force, commanded by the very ENDF leaders previously purged by Abiy. According to former Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) President Getachew, the TDF consists of approximately 270,000 men and women. On the other hand, internal divisions within the TPLF have also weakened Tigray militarily. Key figures who once played central roles in shaping Tigray’s resistance—such as Lieutenant General Tsadkan Gebretensae and Brigadier General Teklay Ashebir—have shifted their allegiances.
This, combined with the defection of former TDF fighters to the newly formed TPF—though only in the hundreds or low thousands—has significantly weakened Tigray’s military capacity and given the ENDF critical insight into its military movements and operational tactics.
However, Ethiopia’s delusion that civilians can undergo a few months of training, receive military ranks, and then be expected to perform like seasoned veterans is a recipe for disaster. Yet this is the ENDF’s current reality: no longer a professional army, but a patchwork of poorly trained conscripts sent to fight in wars they barely understand. Now that Abiy appears to be at odds with the very Eritrean army that carried him to Pretoria, any renewed military campaign against Tigray—or Eritrea, for that matter— appears increasingly unwinnable. Not even the influx of foreign weapons, the construction of drone factories, or the forced conscription of hundreds of thousands more youth can alter the outcome.
In what seemed to be a direct response to Abiy’s latest ultimatum, Senior TDF commander Brigadier General Haileslassie Girmay declared, “We are no longer who we were yesterday.” Speaking at a public event in Adwa, he emphasized that Tigray’s youth are no longer the unprepared and inexperienced generation that existed before the outbreak of the genocidal war. Instead, he said, the region is now shaped by battle-hardened youth “who took up arms to defend their nation and fought for their survival”.
Crucially, hinting at shifting geopolitical currents in the Horn, he remarked, “Those who fought against us yesterday may now stand alongside us. If not allies, they are no longer our enemies. Weakening them and strengthening us.” Furthermore, in a recent interview with BBC Tigrinya, Debretsion, TPLF Chairman, made a resolute declaration: “We will never again be encircled 360 degrees” and “we will no longer live surrounded”.
Abiy’s bid to subjugate Tigray hinged not on confronting its ruling elite directly, but on pressuring its civilian population. His policy of encirclement was more than a military maneuver—it was a calculated geopolitical gambit. By securing federal control over western Tigray, relying on hostile Amhara and Afar forces to exert pressure from the east and south, and leveraging Eritrea’s presence to the north, he sought to fully isolate the region.
Abiy wagered that relentless economic, political, and military pressure would coerce the concessions he had failed to win during the genocidal war. But the unexpected thawing of relations between Tigray and Eritrea has upended his calculations. With his encirclement strategy unraveling, Abiy now finds himself cornered—his missteps exposed, his leverage diminished, and his desperation increasingly visible.
Back to Square One
Much like the fraught atmosphere in the days, weeks, and months leading up to the genocidal war, the air is once again thick with tension. In a recent parliamentary address, Abiy issued what many interpreted as a veiled ultimatum to the people of Tigray, urging religious and political leaders to “immediately begin efforts to prevent another war,” and warning that any initiative taken “after the fighting starts will be meaningless”.
Ethiopia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gedion Timothewos—in a move that appears to border on soliciting U.S. approval for renewed hostilities—sent a formal letter to Secretary Marco Rubio, accusing Eritrea of its “unrelenting cooperation and coordination (with) a faction of the TPLF”, and “other armed groups under their tutelage, to undertake major offensive operations during the upcoming rainy season.”
Eerily echoing early signs of tacit U.S. approval, Abiy boasted that “the world is too distracted by other conflicts to care about another war in Tigray” , a remark many interpret as both ominous and revealing. It’s worth noting that the Tigray war began during the first Trump administration, which at the time appeared sympathetic to Ethiopia’s positions and narratives. On 17 November 2020, then–Secretary of State Mike Pompeo blamed the TPLF for initiating the conflict and praised neighboring Eritrea for the “restraint” it showed.
During his latest address to Parliament, Abiy also stated, “Ethiopia without sea access is not a country” —a remark that seems to signal the inevitability of a future confrontation with Eritrea, where reports indicate the regime is also strengthening its positions near the Tigray border.
Enforcing Pretoria
The only path forward is to step back from the brink and fully implement the Pretoria Agreement. This includes the repatriation of the hundreds of thousands of Tigrayan refugees and internally displaced people, and the restoration of Tigray’s pre-war borders through the complete withdrawal of Eritrean and federally backed Amhara forces.
These measures must be followed by political dialogue between Tigray and the federal government, laying the groundwork for the full disarmament and demobilization of Tigrayan fighters, their return to civilian life, and the eventual reintegration of Tigray into Ethiopia’s federal system through democratic elections. Ethiopia must abandon its belligerent posture toward neighboring states. Any aspirations to secure access to the Red Sea should be pursued exclusively through bilateral negotiations and international diplomacy.
The TPLF faction engaging with Isaias’s Eritrea must recognize that Eritrea is a state devoid of institutional checks and balances—it is ruled entirely by the will of an unhinged dictator. Under such conditions, any commitment, let alone a strategic alignment, lacks the credibility and stability required for meaningful cooperation. This does not mean Tigray cannot—or should not—pursue constructive relations with its neighbors, including Eritreans.
But such engagement must not come at the expense of justice and accountability for wartime abuses and atrocities. The TPLF, the Interim Administration, and all political parties operating in Tigray must initiate an inclusive dialogue aimed at building consensus among Tigrayans. Only through inclusive dialogue, collective engagement, and sustained cooperation can Tigray begin to chart a strategic course out of the deepening quagmire it faces.
Strategic ambiguity—whether manifested through military posturing, diplomatic messaging, or policy signals—can serve short-term goals, but in a region as volatile as the Horn of Africa, it’s a dangerous game. The ongoing jockeying between Tigray, Ethiopia, and Eritrea risks triggering renewed confrontations, where misunderstandings could easily escalate into open conflict.
Historical grievances remain unresolved, while external actors quietly shape outcomes through arms deals, aid packages, and geopolitical alignments. In this combustible environment, any misstep or provocative move could threaten the fragile peace, reigniting another cycle of violence, and plunging the region into another round of instability.
Above all, the guarantors and mediators of the Permanent Cessation of Hostilities Agreement—particularly the African Union and the U.S.—must compel all signatories in Pretoria, especially the Ethiopian government, to uphold the accord in full and act in genuine good faith. The recent statement by General Tadesse Werede, Tigray interim president, affirming that “there will be no war and no provocation from Tigray’s side,” is a welcome development.
Moreover, Debretsion—whose faction has been accused of collaborating with Eritrea, an allegation it strongly rejects—has reiterated the need for a political solution grounded in the Pretoria Agreement. “We urge the international community to pressure the Ethiopian government, its agents, and allies to refrain from preparing for war,” he stated.
The long-term stability of Tigray—and Ethiopia more broadly—hinges on the political will and courage of the Ethiopian government to uphold and fully implement the peace accord it signed. Unfortunately, Prime Minister Abiy appears to be retracing every step he took in the lead up to the start of the genocidal war in 2020. As Gerrit Kurtz of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs observes, Abiy’s strategy is not peace but “to keep all domestic rivals weak enough that they can’t unite against him. That means sometimes aligning with certain factions, while repressing others”.
As the Horn’s powers test this precarious new calculus, one truth remains: in a region where yesterday’s massacres fuel tomorrow’s alliances, even sworn enemies may find themselves in uneasy embrace.
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While this commentary contains the author’s opinions, Ethiopia Insight will correct factual errors.
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Why is secession not viable? If peace with Eritrea, secession is very viable. See Addis Standard – legal exports of gold from tigray generated almost half of Ethiopia’s export income. Tigray sees no benefit from it. Secede, and that is all for tigray.
You are mental rust
Don’t live for food
You are very biased. What ever the cost the tigrayans are in the worst position of all the people are desperate no to fight but to survive
“…Pretoria deal that silenced the guns has yet to be fully implemented. Despite Tigray handing over most of its heavy weapons and demobilizing a large portion of its army…”
Well it sounds like Tigray needs to fully demobilize and return ALL the heavy weapons it stole from government forces.
Therefore Pretoria isn’t fulfilled due to Tigray not implementing its obligations.
I’m not even going to touch the topic of fact how Tigray can label Eritrea and Eritreans rapist looters of high magnitude yesterday to any of this torrent of whatever this is. Tigray holds no cards at this moment so better play nice, no? This is not 2020.
Tigray has decisively lost the war they waged, and are in deep deep debt of all types. Any attempt at flexing using those heavy weapons is call for unrecoverable destruction of Tigray. Looks like Tegaru have to make again.
By the way, suggestion to the Author. Amharas started from grassroots, not by murdering and looting the same defense force that was stationed there to defend them. Not to mention resources and training paid by the Ethiopian people via Tigray controlled security and defense structures of Ethiopia while in power. 30 years. Deluding yourself by repeating “Eritrea-backed” will bring about more humiliation. Or add theft and backstabbing backed Tigray forces?
By the way another point is, can you tell us how many Tegaru live in Amhara region? A couple of hundreds of thousands at least, right? Not to count those that fled self inflicted war of Tigray. Again I suggest reconsider the vitriol as it has consequences.
Ethiopian and tigray fate is at the hand of Eritrean president Isayas Afeworki
and Eritrean Defense force.. The fate
When Regional states disloyal to The central government, the regional goverment should not go to Europe or some where to negotiate with the Central government.
Considering as, Ethiopia government structure is a union based philosophy, these could not help to create a stable and strong nation that could provide for collective security economic strength and unity.
Tsimdo, seen as a harmless people-to-people connection across border towns, I don’t see that turning into Eritrea and Tigray alignment against Abiy. TPLF is aware of the risk involved, and Eritrea is not going to give Abiy an excuse to wage war, which seems to be Abiy’s preferred solution.
The Abiy project is this: he wants TPLF to dissolve, and Tigray subjugated. He went to war for that purpose, his goal remains incomplete, and Abiy is said to be preparing for another war to that end.
TPLF over the many years has fought and done all it can for Tigray, and the time has come that Tigray is exhausted, and its capacity to withstand another war is doubtful. As sad as it sounds, it is time to retire TPLF as a political party, and give other Tigray leaders to navigate through the reintegration of Tigray into Ethiopia. Secession is not a viable option. His recriminations with TPLF aside, Getachew Reda is positioned to have a leading role in the transition to rebuild, towards a peaceful life for the people of Tigray.
For Eritrea, the main concern is Assab. Abiy seems obsessed about Assab, not just for maritime commerce, but military navy as well. However, Eritrea is not helpless about the matter. Eritrea’s mandatory military training makes its people citizen soldiers, and Eritrea would seek and most likely receive support from Egypt to defend Assab. In that case, the cautionary tale is Abiy’s MoU with Somaliland which collapsed when Egypt came in and said it would defend Somalia. The other way for Eritrea to restrain Ethiopia’s unending temptation about Assab is this: for Ethiopia to renounce any claim on Assab. Failing that, Assab becomes the forever tension, the forever risk for conflict.
Well explained and recommended.
Thanks