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The contested northern territory exposes the limits of Ethiopia’s federal design
The recent armed clash between the Ethiopian federal government and Tigrayan forces has once again exposed the fragility of the Pretoria Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, which ended a brutal two-year civil war.
The National Election Board’s decision to designate the contested areas as separate electoral constituencies further heightened tensions. That decision has since been suspended by an injunction issued by the Federal High Court.
More importantly, it underscores the need to address the real source of the conflict. While the dispute between the Tigray and Amhara regions extends beyond Welkait to other border areas, Welkait remains the main sticking point, not only for its historical and political importance but also for its economic significance to both regions.
The Welkait issue is exceptionally complex because it extends beyond identity. Longstanding claims rooted in identity are deeply sensitive, but they are only part of the forces shaping the dispute. Welkait’s strategic location at the intersection of Ethiopia’s borders with Sudan and Eritrea gives it weight that complicates any settlement based solely on administrative or cultural considerations.
Economic factors are equally central. Without downplaying identity claims, economic considerations rank as high as, if not higher than, identity issues. If the problem were purely about language, culture, or ethnicity, it should, at least in theory, be possible to negotiate arrangements that protect those rights regardless of which region administers the area.
Ethiopia itself offers examples: special zones protecting Oromo or Agew rights within the Amhara region, and the self-administration of the Irob people within Tigray. The entrenchment of the Welkait issue suggests that control over land, resources, and economic opportunity is as central to the dispute as identity.
Constitutional Dead End
Unfortunately, the Ethiopian Constitution offers no workable solution. More accurately, the solution it envisages is unlikely to bring lasting peace. The constitution does not specify regional borders and, in territorial disputes, points to one option: a referendum to enforce the will of nations, nationalities, and peoples and realize their right to self-determination.
The Welkait issue cannot be resolved through either a binary referendum or force. A referendum, regardless of how it is organized or who participates, would not address the core problem.
The situation closely resembles the case of Western Sahara, where Morocco and the Polisario Front have never agreed on a UN-mandated vote because of disputes over voter eligibility. Likewise, the Amhara and Tigray regional governments are unlikely to agree on who should vote in a referendum meant to allocate exclusive ‘ownership’ of Welkait to either of them.
Even if such an agreement were somehow reached, neither side appears willing to accept an outcome placing any disputed territory under the other’s administration. Simply put, Amharas are unlikely to accept a result assigning Welkait to Tigray, just as Tigray is unlikely to accept a result placing it within Amhara.
Security Dilemma
Trying to settle the issue through force is equally short-sighted. The experience of the past three decades shows that attempts to control Welkait and the other areas by military means only ossify resentment, harden hostilities, and trap both regions in a destructive security dilemma, while keeping the country at risk of fragmentation. Force may change control on the ground temporarily, but it does nothing to resolve the underlying conflict.
At the same time, any recourse to historical claims of occupation, first presence, or ownership of land is equally unhelpful. There is no agreed cut-off point for how far back history should count, nor evidence that these areas were divinely allocated to either Amharas or Tigrayans.
Even if such claims were advanced, neither side would accept them. In Ethiopia today, historical arguments produce truths convincing only to those who already believe them, and when asserted, they only deepen mistrust.
If neither force nor referendum offers a sustainable solution, where can one be found? It begins with a sober assessment of the available options, what might work and what will not.
Five broad scenarios present themselves: the Status Quo Amhara Option, the Tigray Option, the Joint Administration Option, the Federal Option, and the Self-Administration Option.
Status Quo
This option would leave Welkait under Amhara administration. It is understandably preferred among Amharas and may appear logical to those who believe the Tigray regional government, particularly under the TPLF, failed—or at times responded brutally—to the identity and constitutional rights of Amharas born and raised in Welkait for more than three decades. That failure created deep mistrust and a desire to correct what is seen as historical injustice.
From this perspective, the status quo is justified by past failures, lack of confidence in Tigray regional authorities, and a strong desire to prevent renewed subjugation. However, for obvious reasons, this option is not tenable. Tigrayans would rather engage in prolonged and destructive conflict rather than accept the permanent loss of Welkait.
This resistance also appears to be driven by some Tigrayan elites who have abandoned the idea of a shared Ethiopian future and instead envision an independent Tigrayan state. For them, Welkait represents a strategic and economic lifeline, an outlet that could ensure the viability of such a state and potentially serve as a corridor to weaken and destabilize Ethiopia.
Some former TPLF leaders appear to have drawn lessons from Eritrea’s experience, where independence followed by hostility with the former parent state failed to deliver peace or security.
For these actors, control over Welkait is essential to avoiding a similar fate. As a result, even many Tigrayans who favor a shared future within Ethiopia are unlikely to accept the status quo, making peaceful coexistence extremely difficult.
For this reason alone, the status quo is not viable, regardless of the legitimate grievances endured by Amharas. It also raises legal concerns: maintaining it could set a dangerous precedent for future territorial disputes, ultimately harming the Amhara community itself.
In view of all this, any belief that the status quo could serve as a permanent solution is misguided and self-defeating.
Tigray Option
The absolute opposite of the status quo is the Tigray option, which would place Welkait back under Tigray’s administration. This option is often justified by the displacement and suffering of Tigrayans during the recent war.
The argument, which is understandable, is that many Tigrayans born and raised in Welkait but uprooted by the conflict would be unlikely to feel safe unless the area returned to Tigray. From this perspective, the move is seen as compensation for recent injustices.
It may also align with a strict reading of the constitution, particularly its emphasis on self-determination, which is not necessarily tied to the regional administration in which the people concerned reside. However, the constitutional mechanism for resolving such disputes, including claims to self-determination, is a referendum, an option that is deeply flawed and unlikely to work in practice.
Amharas aver that their grievance predates the constitution, which they believe was crafted under TPLF dominance. They therefore reject resolving their claims through a framework whose legitimacy they question, especially when the injustice they cite predates it. Moreover, this option would require overlooking Amhara suffering, an unacceptable outcome for a community that has endured much.
Compounding this is Tigray’s failure to address the issue for more than thirty years—a blatant disregard for constitutional responsibility. Amharas have little reason to believe their grievances will suddenly be resolved now, after decades of neglect. As a result, Amharas are likely to resist this option, even at great cost.
Joint Administration
This approach would have Amhara and Tigray jointly administer the disputed territories. In principle, it could be ideal, if the parties were not culturally predisposed to zero-sum politics. It would prioritize development and shared prosperity over dominance.
Given Welkait’s resources, the area could become a development corridor and cultural bridge for both regions.
Under current conditions, however, this option is unlikely to succeed. Political elites on both sides prioritize ego, self-interest, and historical grievance over compromise and long-term development. Ethnic outbidding compounds the problem; even moderates fear being labeled traitors.
Leaders appear more willing to engage in costly conflict than invest in peace that could generate shared benefits. Hence, prospects for joint administration remain slim.
Federal Oversight
This option would place the disputed territories under direct federal administration. Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa offer partial precedents. The advantage is a supposedly neutral arbiter managing a dispute the regions have failed to resolve. The federal government could help bridge the political and cultural rift between the two regions and reduce mutual distrust.
The drawback is perception: neither side sees the federal government as neutral. Many elites view it as part of the problem. Legally, the constitution does not explicitly recognize special administrative territories outside the full-fledged regional structure, a status reserved to “nations, nationalities, and peoples.”
Even Dire Dawa required separate federal legislation to manage a situation the constitution had not anticipated. Moreover, applying this model risks adding another layer of complexity to an already complicated problem.
Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa remain contested due to similar perceptions of federal bias and the failure to ensure inclusiveness and equal treatment of different ethnic groups in the city. Extending this model to Welkait could invite additional actors with competing interests, further complicating the situation.
In a country where perception can outweigh reality, the federal option is unlikely to provide a lasting solution.
Self-rule
The final, and perhaps most realistic, option is a self-administered territory. This could take the form of a special autonomous zone or even an additional regional state. Under this arrangement, the disputed territories would be administered by those genuinely rooted in the area: people born, raised, or with demonstrable historical ties to Welkait, regardless of ethnicity.
Over generations, the Welkait people (ወልቃይቴዎች) have developed a distinct, locally rooted identity shaped by shared history, language, and lived experience, one that does not fit neatly into the binary frameworks imposed by regional politics.
In practical terms, Welkait would be governed by the Welkait people, whether Amhara, Tigrayan, or of mixed identity.
Questions of legality may arise, as with the federal model. What makes this option compelling is the layered linguistic and cultural identity of the Welkait people. Contrary to elite narratives, identities here are fluid: residents speak Amharic, Tigrigna, and even Arabic.
A typical member of the Welkait people may have a Tigrigna name but speak with an Amhara accent, or vice versa. For the most part, it would be difficult to find a purely Amhara or purely Tigrayan identity, if such a thing exists at all, in these areas or elsewhere in the country.
This option requires the return of displaced persons, sustained community dialogue, and a genuinely representative local administration. The federal government would facilitate; Amhara and Tigray regions would have minimal oversight.
This approach avoids a referendum on whether Welkait should join Amhara or Tigray and instead focuses on creating an inclusive, democratic governance designed and run by the Welkait people themselves.
An ideal arrangement would involve bilingual administration, with Amharic and Tigrinya used equally in education and public administration. Political, security, and social leadership positions would be shared equally, with rotational arrangements to ensure balance.
For example, under this system, if the zonal administrator is of Amhara descent, the deputy shall be Tigraway, and vice versa, with roles alternating every term as agreed upon by the Welkait people.
The cabinet will also mirror this parity-based balance to create equal representation from both groups and dedicated seats for individuals of mixed heritage to ensure total inclusivity. Cultural and linguistic rights of all communities in the area would be actively promoted.
While this administration would remain autonomous from both neighboring regions, the presence of the Ethiopian National Defense Force or the Federal Police is a practical necessity. Given the strategic location of Welkait near the borders of Sudan and Eritrea, federal oversight is essential to safeguard against broader national security threats while local leaders focus on governance.
Identifying who qualifies as being from Welkait may present some challenges, but these are not insurmountable. Criteria such as birth, long-term residence, and historical ties can be applied. The more democratic and inclusive the administration, the less central identity becomes.
Identity conflicts tend to thrive where oppression replaces dialogue and participation. To formalize this, a referendum under Article 47(3) of the constitution offers the best path forward. This would not be a vote to ‘give’ Welkait to the Amhara or Tigray region, but a chance for the Welkait people to decide if they wish to chart their own course as a self-administered territory or a distinct regional state.
Ultimately, if this option is properly pursued, Welkait and the surrounding areas will not only act as a bridge between the two currently hostile regions and, over time, reduce animosity, but also become a powerful example of how to manage diversity, both for the rest of Ethiopia and beyond.
The Welkait model has the potential to be the guiding reference for a future, inclusive, and democratic Ethiopia; it is both a dream to be aspired to and a vision to be fulfilled.
Shared Sovereignty
No Ethiopian territory, whether in Tigray, Amhara, Afar, Oromia, Somali, or Benishangul-Gumuz, belongs exclusively to one people or region.
The constitution is clear: land is the common property of all nations, nationalities, and peoples of Ethiopia. Welkait is no different, just as Addis Abeba, Bahir Dar, Mekelle, or Kebri Dehar belong to all Ethiopians.
Otherwise, why would an Amhara or an Oromo sacrifice his life to defend a border in the Somali Region from foreign invasion? Why would a Somali, Tigrayan, or any other Ethiopian do the same when sovereignty is threatened beyond his or her home region? Because the land defended is part of a shared country belonging to all.
Only this understanding can make Ethiopia strong, united, and prosperous. Anything less, as our history has shown again and again, will condemn us to endless cycles of conflict, suffering, and poverty. The choice is ours, and the perfect time to choose is now.
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While this commentary contains the author’s opinions, Ethiopia Insight will correct factual errors.
Main photo: Humera city, Kafta Humera Woreda, Ethiopia. Source: Social media.
Published under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International licence. You may not use the material for commercial purposes.
We will no longer accept a nation building akin to imperial times when successive Ethiopian rulers sought to disrupt the historical continuities of Tigray and its people by dividing up the entity along artificially imposed lines (e.g. Mereb Milash, Tekezze Milash, etc). Such delimitations were bifurcations of one people involving marginalization, linguistic assimilation, and strategic territorial reduction as a means of bolstering the center/s of the Ethiopian Empire.
Past Ethiopian rulers, for the reduction of historical Tigray territory and legacy, used foreign forces (e.g., Italy); likewise, today their political descendants invited multiple foreign forces (Eritrea, Somalia, et al.) for the same and more genocidal purpose.
We are conscious. The panaca is allow Tigray to function on its own, restore the constitutional Tigray, and install people to people reconciliation. I know this idea is anathema to ppl like Abiy Ahmed.
This man speaks about sovereignty. Yet in Ethiopia—while educated people like you watch and even sponsor such actions—the country’s sovereignty and dignity have been violated to alter demography and geography over the graveyard of the Tigray people.
I feel that some elites have become morally unmoored and need to reflect deeply on their responsibilities.
Even if Eritrean forces are no longer present in Western Tigray today, it was through the agency of those foreign forces that the area came under occupation. Their involvement made the current reality possible.
For us, Western Tigray is not simply a matter of territory—especially after the genocide. It is the darkest place, where we still do not know who is alive and who was killed. Addressing it requires an international framework.
This is not a contest for land. That is not what this is about.
At this point, it is clear to me that neither historical claims nor legal arguments alone will resolve the return of Western Tigray to Tigray. No argument can adequately confront the reality of ethnic cleansing—and the ethnic cleansing has already been carried out. If HISTORY MATTERS OVER PEOPLE AND SLEF DETERMINATION IN A MODERN AND CIVILIZED WAY: HER IS A READ: Western Tigray is a Tigrayan Territory since antiquity: https://www.tghat.com/2023/03/28/western-tigray-a-tigrayan-territory-since-antiquity/
If people like Zola had any human instinct, they would never use the term “Wolqait.” Doing so reflects malicious intent. Many people support the Tigray genocide—whether by omission or commission—while at the same time blaming “failed federalism,” as if that explains or excuses what happened.
It is astonishing that he attempts to frame the area as strategically important because of its location and resources. By that logic, should Tigrayans start claiming every resource-rich or strategically located area in the Amhara region?
At this point, it is clear to me that neither historical claims nor legal arguments alone will resolve the return of Western Tigray to Tigray. No argument can adequately confront the reality of ethnic cleansing—and the ethnic cleansing has already been carried out.
Do Not Make the Indisputable Disputable
Amhara´s expansionists have claimed that “Tigray annexed lands from Amhara.” This invalid, unconstitutional and politically motivated accusation has been used to commit ethnic cleansing of Tigrayans in Western Tigray with the potential support of the Ethiopian regime and the invading State of Eritrea. People are maliciously using the term“Welkait“ an unconstitutional expression itself that makes the indisputable Western Tigray unfairly disputable. With blessings of elites like Zola Moges the joint forces the occupiers are undertaking the ethnic cleansing, and changing demography, built environment, social landscape, and language.
You argue that ballots (referendums) cannot resolve Welkait because voter eligibility will be contested and because neither side will accept an outcome that places the territory under the other’s administration. You brought up the Western Sahara analogy, which reinforces this concern: when eligibility is disputed, referendums become indefinite stalemates.
Yet the architecture of your preferred solution relies on a referendum under Article 47(3) to formalize self-administration. This reveals a central contradiction. If the core problem is defining who counts as a legitimate voter, autonomy does not remove that problem—it relocates it. The dispute shifts from “who votes on regional affiliation” to “who qualifies as Welkait.”
Eligibility disputes do not disappear; they intensify at the founding moment of a new political entity. In contexts of displacement and mistrust, criteria such as birthplace, residency, and ancestry become arenas of political contestation. Western Sahara is not merely a caution about binary referendums; it is a warning about plebiscites without robust verification institutions, which can lead to unresolved disputes and further conflict if not properly managed.
Critiques of Zola Moges’s Article, “The Welkait Quagmire: Neither Ballots nor Bullets Can Resolve”
While Zola Moges’s article offers a seemingly pragmatic path forward for the Welkait region, its central proposal, the creation of a new regional state for the “Welkait people”, is built upon a series of fundamental legal and conceptual flaws. The analysis fails to properly define the nature of the dispute, identify the relevant community, and navigate the constitutional procedures required for state creation. Consequently, the proposed “solution” is not only legally untenable but also exacerbates the very ambiguities it seeks to resolve.
1. The Identity of Welkait: “Fluidity at the Margins, a Center of Gravity at the Core”
Despite numerous official census data, historical records and cartographic documents, Zola Moges, in his article titled “The Welkait Quagmire: Neither Ballots nor Bullets Can Resolve,” makes a claim about identity in the disputed territory that deserves scrutiny:
“Contrary to elite narratives, identities here are fluid: residents speak Amharic, Tigrigna, and even Arabic. A typical member of the Welkait people may have a Tigrigna name but speak with an Amhara accent, or vice versa. For the most part, it would be difficult to find a purely Amhara or purely Tigrayan identity, if such a thing exists at all, in these areas or elsewhere in the country.”
Tareke Gebru in his authoritative account of the region’s strategic importance, Tareke writes:
“The region was a well-watered expanse of fertile plains encircled by towering mountains and deep ravines. More than half of the population spoke Tigrinya, while a significant portion of the rest were bilingual, speaking both Amharic and Tigrinya. The people were renowned for their dissident culture, inhabiting a peripheral zone where outlaws often sought refuge, and state officials were reluctant to venture. The locals were famously fond of firearms. It was here, for example, that the American M-16 assault rifle earned the nickname Imiye, or ‘Mother-16.’ The area was remote, isolated, and relatively inaccessible to the military, making it far easier to defend than to conquer from both a topographical and cultural perspective.”
— Tareke Gebru (2016). The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa, Eclipse Printing Press. p. 307
Notably, Tareke states plainly that “more than half of the population spoke Tigrinya,” with bilingualism characterizing only “a significant portion of the rest.” This suggests that while cultural exchange occurred at the margins, the dominant orientation of the Welkait people has long been Tigrinya-speaking. A “dissident culture” inhabiting a “peripheral zone” does not necessarily constitute a distinct, autonomous identity separate from Tigrayan identity; it may simply describe Tigrayans who resisted state authority. If Moges wishes to argue that the Welkait people possess a hybrid identity irreducible to either Amhara or Tigrayan categories, he must reconcile his claim with evidence that Tigrinya language and culture have been demographically and historically predominant in the area. Fluidity at the margins does not erase a clear center of gravity.
Giovanni Ellero’s ethnographic study Il Uolcaìt (1948), based on field research in the late 1930s, provides direct demographic and linguistic evidence. The following excerpt from Giovanni Ellero’s “Il Uolcaìt” (1948) provides direct ethnographic evidence on the social, linguistic, and demographic characteristics of Wolqayt:
“Sebbene isolato dai Tigré, il Uolcait suole esserne considerato parte, sia perché tigrina ne è la massa della popolazione, con iniezioni amhara, e tigrino ne è il linguaggio, sebbene deformato nel lessico in modo da assumere spiccate caratteristiche dialettali. L’amarico è compreso da buona parte della popolazione e, per così dire, tollerato nella vita d’ogni giorno. Un censimento dell’autorità italiana accertò la presenza di 2060 famiglie, delle quali 1965 cristiane (318 di ex-schiavi in gran parte residenti stabilmente nel Mezega), 73 musulmanee 22 falascia. Data una composizione di cinque persone per famiglia, si hanno 10.300 abitanti. La natura è qui più generosa che altrove nel Tigré. Terreni ottimi, abbondanza d’acque, selvaggina, pesci.”
Ellero, Giovanni. “Il Uolcaìt.” In Antropologia e storia d’Etiopia. Note sullo Scirè, l’Endertà, i Tacruri e l’Uolcaìt‘, Rassegna di Studi Etiopici, Vol. 7, No. 1 (gennaio-giugno 1948), pp. 89-112
This quoted passage contextually translated from Italian as follows:
“Although isolated from Tigray, Wolqayt is generally considered a part of it. This is both because the bulk of the population is Tigrinya, with an Amhara admixture, and because the language is Tigrinya, albeit deformed in its lexicon in a way that gives it pronounced dialectal characteristics. Amharic is understood by a good part of the population and is, so to speak, tolerated in daily life. A census by the Italian authorities recorded the presence of 2,060 families, of which 1,965 were Christian (318 families of former slaves, largely settled permanently in Mezega), 73 were Muslim, and 22 were Falasha. Assuming an average family size of five persons, this gives 10,300 inhabitants. Nature is more generous here than elsewhere in Tigray. There are excellent soils, an abundance of water, game, and fish.”
Ellero’s census data confirms a predominantly Tigrinya-speaking population, with Amharic “tolerated” but not dominant.
Professor Alberto Sbacchi, in Ethiopia under Mussolini: Fascism and the Colonial Experience (1985), describes Italian administrative decisions:
“Lessona insisted that Amhara include territories of Amharic-speaking people. The region of Tselemt, though a Tigrean- speaking area, was annexed to Amhara to secure a well- defined frontier of that governorship (meaning Amhara governorship during Italian occupation), along the Takaze river. Other regions such as Wolkait, Woldeba, Tsegade, Semien, Wogera, and Belesa were inhabited by Tigrean -speaking people rather than Amhara. All of these regions south of the Setit River gravitated economically towards Asmera and not to Gondar.”
Sbacchi thus confirms both the Tigrinya-speaking character of Wolkait and its economic orientation toward the Tigray-Eritrea sphere.
Professor Edward Ullendorff, in The Semitic Languages of Ethiopia: A Comparative Phonology (1955), provides:
“Tigriňa is spoken in the area largely identical with that of the old Aksumite Empire and may thus lay claim to being, at least geographically, the direct successor of Ge’ez. Its territory covers the administrative divisions of Hamasen, Serae, Akkele Guzay, the fringes of the Keren and Massawa divisions, the Tigre province itself, and as far to the south-west as Walqayt.”
In The Ethiopians: An Introduction to Country and People (second edition), Ullendorff further elaborates:
“Tigrinya, as the name implies, is the language of the Tigrai province. It is spoken throughout the Eritrean plateau and extends as far south as Lake Ashangi and the Wojerat district; it then crosses the Takkaze westwards to the Tsellemti and Wolkayt regions. And the people who speak this language are the authentic carriers of the historical and cultural traditions of ancient Abyssinia.”
Franz Praetorius, in his 1871 work Grammatik der Tigrinasprache in Abessinien, draws on d’Abbadie to define the Tigrinya linguistic territory:
“Das Sprachgebiet des Tña bestimmt Abbadie a. a. O. folgendermassen: § 3 Langue tǝgr-yaña, parlée dans le Tǝgray proprement dit, l’Agame, l’Akala gouzay, le Sarawe, le Hamasen, le Dimbijan et à l’ouest du Tekaze, dans le Walkayt, le Waldouba, le Sawana et les environs de Dôbbahar.² Ueber die Dialekte der Sprache sagt er ferner: On doit y distinguer les dialectes suivants, a) de l’Agame b) d’Abba Garima c) du Walk’ayt, et peut-être du Hamasen.”
The following passage is an English translation of the quoted text. The original German version is provided in the cited work.
“The linguistic territory of Tigrinya…. includes Tigray proper, Agame, Akala Gouzay, Sarawe, Hamasen, Dimbijan, and west of the Tekaze, in Walkayt, Waldouba, Sawana, and the environs of Dôbbahar.” Concerning dialects, he notes: “One must distinguish the following dialects: a) that of Agame, b) of Abba Garima, c) of Walk’ayt, and perhaps that of Hamasen.”
The identification of Walk’ayt as having its own dialect of Tigrinya is particularly significant. It presupposes Tigrinya as the foundational language, while acknowledging local distinctiveness.
Donald N. Levine, in Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of a Multiethnic Society (1974), provides economic geography that reinforces this picture:
“To the regional market at Debre Tabor… people brought… cotton from the Tigrean district of Wolqait (eleven days).”
Levine’s identification of Wolqait as a “Tigrean district” reflects scholarly consensus on its regional affiliation.
Alemseged Abbay, in “Identity Jilted or Reimagining Identity? The Divergent Paths of the Eritrean and Tigrayan Nationalist Struggles,” documents how mid-twentieth-century political actors understood the territories of Tselemti, Ulcait and Zeghedie. The Liberal Progressive Party (LPP), advocating for an independent “Tigray-Tigrignie” state, argued for:
“Eritrea which trusts in the fairness of the Great Powers, is anxiously waiting for the proclamation of its INDEPENDENCE with the consequent annexation of the Тigray territory, including territory between the Taccazze river and the stream Ala, the territories of Tselemti, Ulcait and Zeghedie, the latters [the last three] being populations of Tigray origins.82” (Emphasis added)
Here, Ulcait (Welkait) is explicitly identified as having “Tigray origins”, a claim made not by contemporary polemicists but by political actors in the 1940s seeking self-determination.
Conclusion: Center of Gravity vs. Fluid Margins
The evidence assembled here, spanning ethnographic observation, linguistic scholarship, colonial records, economic geography, and political history, and many others, consistently supports the predominant orientation of Welkait, demographically, linguistically, and in popular self-understanding, has long been Tigrayan/Tigrinya, with a distinct local character that does not negate that fundamental belonging.
Zola Moges’s portrait of “fluid identity” captures the margins, the bilingual minority, the cultural exchange, the Amharic understood by some. But it obscures the center. The question is not whether “purely” Amhara or Tigrayan identity exists; such purity may be rare anywhere in Ethiopia. The question is whether “distinctive Tigrayan identity with local characteristics and some bilingualism” better captures the reality these sources reveal than Zola’s framing of irreducible fluidity. The evidence suggests it does. Whatever fluidity exists at the margins, the official, cartographic and historical documents establishes a clear linguistic center of gravity. Consequently, fluidity at the margins does not erase a clear center of gravity. Therefore, the absence of “pure identity” in the Welkait, to use Zola’s term, cannot be used to argue aganst classifying the Welkait community as either Tigrayan or Amhara.
2. An Undefined Welkait Issue: The Legal Nature of the Welkait Issue
Beyond the empirical evidence, a more fundamental problem afflicts Zola’s analysis. Zola never defines the legal nature of the Welkait issue. While Zola discusses legal mechanisms, the Constitution, referendums, Article 47(3), he never actually classifies what kind of legal dispute Welkait represents.
Legally speaking, what is this dispute about? Is it: A border dispute between two or more states under article 48 of the FDRE Constitution? An identity claim by a community seeking recognition as a “nation, nationality, or people” under Article 39(5) of the FDRE Constitution? A self-determination claim under Article 39(3) of the FDRE Constitution?
Zola’s Article never answers these threshold questions. Reading between the lines, the article implies certain legal characterizations without ever making them explicit. He does not examine whether the claim is brought by the right parties under the Constitution. He tells us what won’t work (referendum, force) and what might work (self-administration), but he never tells us, in legal terms, what the problem actually is. However, it is both wrong and impractical to propose a legal solution without first identifying, in legal terms, what the dispute actually entails.
3. The Undefined “Welkait People”
The article’s central concept, the very community for whom statehood is proposed, remains critically undefined. Zola writes:
“Over generations, the Welkait people (ወልቃይቴዎች) have developed a distinct, locally rooted identity shaped by shared history, language, and lived experience, one that does not fit neatly into the binary frameworks imposed by regional politics.”
If their identity is “distinct” and “locally rooted,” then it is something, but the article never defines what that something is, except in negative terms (neither purely Amhara nor purely Tigrayan). A reasonable reader is left asking: What, positively, is a Welkait identity? Is it distinct from both Amhara and Tigray? If so, what are its constituent elements? Zola never states the affirmative content of this identity. This omission becomes fatal when the article attempts to operationalize the category for constitutional purposes:
“Identifying who qualifies as being from Welkait may present some challenges, but these are not insurmountable. Criteria such as birth, long-term residence, and historical ties can be applied.”
This response evades the central difficulty. The same “fluid identity” that makes the Amhara/Tigray binary problematic also makes defining a “Welkait person” problematic. If identities are fluid, then what constitutes “long-term residence”? How many years? What counts as “historical ties”? How does one distinguish a “Welkait person” from a Tigrayan who has lived in the area for two generations? What about Amharas who have resided there for three generations?
The article invokes a coherent community but provides no criteria for its boundaries. For any self-administration scheme, let alone a claim to statehood, this is a crucial omission. A community cannot be the subject of constitutional rights if it cannot be defined.
4. The Referendum Contradiction
Perhaps the most striking internal contradiction concerns the referendum mechanism itself. The article explicitly states: “The Welkait issue cannot be resolved through …. a referendum.” Yet later it argues: “To formalize this, a referendum under Article 47(3) of the constitution offers the best path forward.”
The article offers no resolution of this contradiction. It argues that a binary referendum (Amhara vs. Tigray) is unworkable, drawing a comparison to Western Sahara, noting that parties cannot agree on voter eligibility, and observing that neither side would accept defeat. Yet when proposing self-administration through statehood, the author suddenly embraces a referendum as “the best path forward.”
If a referendum to determine territorial dispute is unworkable due to disputes over voter eligibility and likely rejection of results, why would a referendum for statehood under Article 47(3) be any more workable? The same obstacles apply. The article asserts, but does not demonstrate, why this referendum would succeed where the other must fail. This confusion is compounded by Zola’s conflation of distinct referendum types under the FDRE Constitution:
1. A referendum under Article 39(5) to determine whether Welkait residents constitute a distinct “Nation, Nationality or People.”
2. A referendum under Article 47(3) to determine whether a recognized community should form its own state.
3. A referendum under Article 48 (or a decision by the House of Federation) to determine whether disputed territory belongs to Tigray or Amhara.
Under Article 48 of FDRE Constitution, if the Tigray and Amhara regional states cannot reach an agreement, the House of Federation must decide. Its decision can place the territory entirely within Tigray, entirely within Amhara, or partition the territory between the two concerned states. This third option, partition, is explicitly contemplated by the constitutional framework, yet Zola’s analysis never engages with it.
5. The Constitutional Hurdle: Articles 39(5) and Article 47(3) of FDRE Constitution
Most fundamentally, Zola overlooks a threshold constitutional requirement. Under Article 39(5) of the FDRE Constitution, only a “Nation, Nationality or People”, defined as a community with a distinct identity (distinct common language, common culture or similar customs, common physiological makeup, predominantly continuous territory and belief in a common or related identities) can exercise the right to self-determination, including the right to form their own state under Article 47(3) of the FDRE Constitution.
The article never establishes, indeed never attempts to establish, that the “Welkait people” meet this constitutional definition. The very “fluid identity” thesis, which denies clear Amhara or Tigrayan categorization, cuts against establishing the kind of distinct, coherent, and bounded identity that Article 39(5) requires. If the Welkait people cannot be clearly distinguished from either Amhara or Tigrayan categories, on what basis can they claim status as a separate “Nation, Nationality or People”?
Even if one were to assume that the “Welkait people” qualify under Article 39(5) of FDRE Constitution, they must first obtain formal recognition of their distinct identity, either by the Tigray State Council or by the House of Federation. Further, they must establish self administration with a legislative council in the Welkait area that can approve a demand for statehood. Only after these steps can they request statehood formation under Article 47(3) of FDRE Constitution. The jurisdictional predicate for an Article 47(3) referendum has not been met. Zola proposes a remedy without establishing that his proposed beneficiary is entitled to it. A legal solution cannot precede the legal status upon which it depends.
6. Misidentifying the Dispute: A Fundamental Category Error
Beyond the procedural hurdles, Zola’s proposal suffers from a more fundamental flaw: a category error in identifying the legal nature of the Welkait issue. He treats it as a self-determination claim under Article 47(3) of the FDRE Constitution, paving the way for the creation of a new regional state. However, the issue as it has publicly unfolded is not a claim for statehood. For over a decade, the question raised by community representatives and debated in various media outlets has been an identity question under Article 39(5) of FDRE Constitution, specifically, a claim that the inhabitants of Welkait are Amhara. This characterization is supported by, among other things, the letter written by the then-Speaker of the House of Federation, which framed the matter as one of identity clarification.
The Constitution provides distinct legal remedies for different types of claims. An identity recognition claim under Article 39(5) of FDRE Constitution follows a different path than a border adjustment claim under Article 48 of FDRE Constitution, and both are fundamentally distinct from a statehood claim under Article 47(3) of FDRE Constitution. Before any legal solution can be proposed, the claim itself must be properly identified, as articulated by the concerned community or regional states. A scholar’s task is to interpret the constitutional framework to address the claim as it exists, not to manufacture a new claim and then prescribe a solution for it.
Zola’s article does precisely that: it constructs a new claim, statehood for a “Welkait people”, which has never been raised by those who purport to represent the Welkait community within the Tigray region. In doing so, he does not resolve the existing dispute; he creates a hypothetical one. This proposal rests on a series of unproven and unstated assumptions.
Zola’s article offers no evidence for any of these assumptions. It leaps directly to a remedy without first establishing that his proposed beneficiary is entitled to it, or that the beneficiary has even made the claim for which the remedy is designed. A legal solution cannot be built on a foundation of unexamined premises.
7. Statehood Referendum Organized by the Concerned State Council
Zola proposes a referendum under Article 47(3) for the “Welkait people” to form a new state. But assuming, for the sake of argument, that a demand for statehood exists, Article 47(3) of the FDRE Constitution clearly states that the concerned State Council, upon receiving a demand approved by a two-thirds majority, shall organize a referendum within one year to be held in the nation that made the demand. Zola concedes that the Welkait area is constitutionally delimited within the Tigray Regional State, even though the Amhara Regional State has been exercising de facto control of the area following the 2020 war. This raises a critical question he neither asks nor answers: Who has the authority to organize a statehood referendum in the Welkait area according to Article 47(3) of the FDRE Constitution?
Constitutionally speaking, the Tigray Regional State’s council is the only body with the authority to organize such a referendum. However, for the Tigray State Council to do so, the Amhara region would first have to evacuate the area, and the Tigray state would need to be in a position to control and administer it. Otherwise, the Tigray Regional State’s council cannot fulfill its constitutional mandate. This circularity is fatal. The very question of which State Council has the authority to organize the referendum is the core of the dispute. Article 47(3) presupposes a settled jurisdictional context; Article 48, by contrast, is the constitutional mechanism designed for situations where jurisdiction itself is contested.
Until those fundamental questions are answered and the post-war constitutional order is restored, the “Welkait model” remains not a solution, but a hope, and hopes, however noble, do not resolve constitutional quagmires.
Conclusion: A Misdirected Proposal
Zola’s article ultimately proposes a legal remedy for a claim that has not been properly raised, by a community that has not been properly defined, through a process that is procedurally impossible under the current circumstances. The task of a legal scholar is to interpret the existing constitutional framework to resolve a dispute as it is presented by the concerned parties. By manufacturing a new claim for statehood without first resolving the foundational questions of identity and territorial jurisdiction, Zola does not offer a solution to the quagmire but rather adds a layer of conceptual confusion that makes a resolution more, not less, difficult to achieve.
References
A. Scholarly Articles and Papers
1. Zeray W. A. Teklay, “Towards Defining Tigrinya Ethno-Linguistic Territories: Mapping Language, Settlement, and Identity.”, UMD Media Website, February 7, 2026.
2. Z.W. “Constitutional Supremacy and Contested Territories in Ethiopia: Pathways under Article 10(4) of the Pretoria Agreement and Article 2(1)(d) of the Nairobi Declaration.” UMD Media Website, October 2, 2025.
3. ዘርአይ ወልደሰንበት, “የወልቃይት የማንነት ጥያቄ- በታሪክና በሕገ መንግስቱ”, HornAffairs.com, June 2, 2016.
4. Zeray W/senbet. “The Legality of The Wolqait Question: Issues to Worry About.” HornAffairs.com, September 15, 2016.
5. Ellero, Giovanni. “Il Uolcaìt.” In Antropologia e storia d’Etiopia. Note sullo Scirè, l’Endertà, i Tacruri e l’Uolcaìt. Rassegna di Studi Etiopici, Vol. 7, No. 1 (gennaio-giugno 1948).
B. Books and Monographs
1. Tareke, Gebru. The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa. New Haven: Eclipse Printing Press, 2016.
2. Sbacchi, Alberto. Ethiopia under Mussolini: Fascism and the Colonial Experience. London: Zed Books, 1985.
3. Levine, Donald N. Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of a Multiethnic Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974.
4. Ullendorff, Edward. The Semitic Languages of Ethiopia: A Comparative Phonology. London: Taylor’s (Foreign) Press, 1955.
5. Ullendorff, Edward. The Ethiopians: An Introduction to Country and People. 2nd ed. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.
6. Praetorius, Franz. Grammatik der Tigrinasprache in Abessinien. Halle: Verlag der Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1871.
7. Abbay, Alemseged. “Identity Jilted or Re-imagining Identity? The Divergent Paths of the Eritrean and Tigrayan Nationalist Struggles.” In The Challenge of Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa, Trenton: Red Sea Press, 2003.
C. News and Media Reports
1. Voice of America (Tigrigna). “ወልቃይት ጠገዴ ጉዳይ ወደ ትግራይ ክልል ተመራ”https://tigrigna.voanews.com/a/welkite-tsgedie-case-sent-to-tigray-region-said-colonel-demeke/3276789.html.
D. Video and Audiovisual Sources
1. የወልቃይት ጠገዴ የአማራ ማንነት አስመላሽ ኮሚቴ ህዝባዊ ውይይት በደብረ ታቦር https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ny1P5bKFI6I.
2. ወልቃይት ትናንት ና ዛሬ ክፍል አንድ
YouTube video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FjQojQ_CthY.
3. ወልቃይት ትናንት ና ዛሬ የወልቃይት ጠገዴ የማንነት ጥያቄ ክፍል ሁለት YouTubevideo,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XhIumLpFrCA.
4. YouTube video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AWYjzYfD7SU.
The original sin was because of Abiy’s animosity towards TPLF and Tigray, he made no effort to stop the displacement of Tigrayans from Welkait and other places. This was Abiy’s reward to the Amharas for their alliance and support. The problem now is that once “ethnic cleansing” is done on a such a scale, it is almost irreversible.
Aby is not going to use military force against Amharas to return Tigrayans to their homes, the Amharas do not have the good will for the displaced Tigrayans to return, and Abiy’s position seems to be to let the issue fester into oblivion over time.
In so far as Amharas and Tigrayans are incapable of living in peace together in Welkait, and the displacement is difficult to undone, an enlightened political leader would consider a plan to ease the pain and hardship of those displaced: an economic project for the reconstruction of Tigray, to repair the damage from the war, that would include resettlement of the displaced people in Tigray to rebuild their lives. However, Abiy and his PP cadre might not have that level of good will for the rehabilitation of Tigray, and therein lies the dilemma.
The original sin is that Abiy formed alliance with Amhara extremists who shared his disdain for TPLF and Tigray
Challenging Zola Moges on Welkait: A Response
1. The Identity Question: Fluidity at the Margins, a Center of Gravity at the Core
Despite numerous historical and cartographic documents, Zola Moges, in his article titled “The Welkait Quagmire: Neither Ballots nor Bullets Can Resolve,” makes a claim about identity in the disputed territory that deserves scrutiny:
“Contrary to elite narratives, identities here are fluid: residents speak Amharic, Tigrigna, and even Arabic. A typical member of the Welkait people may have a Tigrigna name but speak with an Amhara accent, or vice versa. For the most part, it would be difficult to find a purely Amhara or purely Tigrayan identity, if such a thing exists at all, in these areas or elsewhere in the country.”
Yet the very historian Moges might invoke to support his argument, Gebru Tareke, offers a description that undermines this portrait of fluid ambiguity. In his authoritative account of the region’s strategic importance, Tareke writes:
“The region was a well-watered expanse of fertile plains encircled by towering mountains and deep ravines. More than half of the population spoke Tigrinya, while a significant portion of the rest were bilingual, speaking both Amharic and Tigrinya. The people were renowned for their dissident culture, inhabiting a peripheral zone where outlaws often sought refuge, and state officials were reluctant to venture. The locals were famously fond of firearms. It was here, for example, that the American M-16 assault rifle earned the nickname Imiye, or ‘Mother-16.’ The area was remote, isolated, and relatively inaccessible to the military, making it far easier to defend than to conquer from both a topographical and cultural perspective.” — Tareke Gebru (2016). The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa. Eclipse Printing Press. p. 307
Notably, Tareke states plainly that “more than half of the population spoke Tigrinya,” with bilingualism characterizing only “a significant portion of the rest.” This suggests that while cultural exchange occurred at the margins, the dominant orientation of the Welkait people has long been Tigrinya-speaking. A “dissident culture” inhabiting a “peripheral zone” does not necessarily constitute a distinct, autonomous identity separate from Tigrayan identity; it may simply describe Tigrayans who resisted state authority. If Moges wishes to argue that the Welkait people possess a hybrid identity irreducible to either Amhara or Tigrayan categories, he must reconcile his claim with evidence that Tigrinya language and culture have been demographically and historically predominant in the area. Fluidity at the margins does not erase a clear center of gravity.
2. Folk Verses as Testimony: Indigenous Self-Perception
Giovanni Ellero (1948; field data recorded 1939-40) documented identity issues and territorial dynamics in Welkait in the early twentieth century. His ethnographic account includes two folk verses that powerfully illuminate how the people of Welkait and their neighbors understood themselves and each other.
To characterize the indomitable spirit of the Welkait people, Ellero cited a verse commonly used by local farmers:
ዓደይ ትግራይ፡ ማሕረሰይ ወልቃይት
ላሕመይ ሕንጊድ፡ ሰበይተይ ኮራይት
ተራኺበን ክልተ ኣራዊት
Contextually translated from Tigrinya, it means:
My homeland is Tigray, my croplands are Welkait,
My cow is wild, my wife is fierce, Now, the two have joined their forces.
The term ኣራዊት (arawit), when used for people, denotes someone who is not easy to handle, underscoring the proud and defiant nature attributed to the people of Welkait. Crucially, this verse asserts a primary identity rooted in Tigray (“My homeland is Tigray”), with Welkait as an integral, productive part of that homeland.
Conversely, the people of Gondar had their own verse:
ወልቃይት ፀገዴ ሰሜን አርማጭሆ
ኣልገዛም ኣልሽ፡ ተገዛሽ እነሆ
Translated from Amharic, it reads:
Welkait, Tsegede, Semien, and Armachiho,
You said, “I will not be ruled,” and yet! You have been subjugated.
This verse reveals a mentality of subjugating a region perceived as external. The rhetorical question is telling: if these areas, Welkait, Tsegede, Semien, Armachiho, were already under Gondar’s jurisdiction, why would the verse highlight their defiant statement, “ኣልገዛም ኣልሽ” (algezam alsh, “you said I will not surrender”)? The verse itself indicates that at certain points in history, these areas were brought under control by Gondar, whether by force or by decree. It frames the relationship not as one of inherent belonging, but as one of victory and imposed authority.
These folk verses, recorded by an observer in the late 1930s, serve as powerful popular testimonies to the long-standing Tigrinya character of the Welkait area. The Tigrinya verse expresses internal self-understanding; the Amharic verse inadvertently confirms external perception.
3. Linguistic and Ethnographic Scholarship
The scholarly record across more than a century consistently places Welkait within Tigrinya-speaking territory.
Professor Edward Ullendorff, in The Semitic Languages of Ethiopia: A Comparative Phonology (1955), provides:
“Tigriňa is spoken in the area largely identical with that of the old Aksumite Empire and may thus lay claim to being—at least geographically—the direct successor of Ge’ez. Its territory covers the administrative divisions of Hamasen, Serae, Akkele Guzay, the fringes of the Keren and Massawa divisions, the Tigre province itself, and as far to the south-west as Walqayt.”
In The Ethiopians: An Introduction to Country and People (second edition), Ullendorff further elaborates:
“Tigrinya—as the name implies—is the language of the Tigrai province. It is spoken throughout the Eritrean plateau and extends as far south as Lake Ashangi and the Wojerat district; it then crosses the Takkaze westwards to the Tsellemti and Wolkayt regions. And the people who speak this language are the authentic carriers of the historical and cultural traditions of ancient Abyssinia.”
Franz Praetorius, in his 1871 work Grammatik der Tigrinasprache in Abessinien, draws on d’Abbadie to define the Tigrinya linguistic territory:
“The linguistic territory of Tigrinya…. includes Tigray proper, Agame, Akala Gouzay, Sarawe, Hamasen, Dimbijan, and west of the Tekaze, in Walkayt, Waldouba, Sawana, and the environs of Dôbbahar.” Concerning dialects, he notes: “One must distinguish the following dialects: a) that of Agame, b) of Abba Garima, c) of Walk’ayt, and perhaps that of Hamasen.”
The identification of Walk’ayt as having its own dialect of Tigrinya is particularly significant. It presupposes Tigrinya as the foundational language, while acknowledging local distinctiveness.
4. Colonial-Era Documentation
Giovanni Ellero’s ethnographic study Il Uolcaìt (1948), based on field research in the late 1930s, provides direct demographic and linguistic evidence:
“Although isolated from Tigray, Wolqayt is generally considered a part of it. This is both because the bulk of the population is Tigrinya, with an Amhara admixture, and because the language is Tigrinya, albeit deformed in its lexicon in a way that gives it pronounced dialectal characteristics. Amharic is understood by a good part of the population and is, so to speak, tolerated in daily life. A census by the Italian authorities recorded the presence of 2,060 families, of which 1,965 were Christian… Assuming an average family size of five persons, this gives 10,300 inhabitants.”
Ellero’s census data confirms a predominantly Tigrinya-speaking population, with Amharic “tolerated” but not dominant.
Professor Alberto Sbacchi, in Ethiopia under Mussolini: Fascism and the Colonial Experience (1985), describes Italian administrative decisions:
“Lessona insisted that Amhara include territories of Amharic-speaking people. The region of Tselemt, though a Tigrean-speaking area, was annexed to Amhara to secure a well-defined frontier… Other regions such as Wolkait, Woldeba, Tsegade, Semien, Wogera, and Belesa were inhabited by Tigrean-speaking people rather than Amhara. All of these regions south of the Setit River gravitated economically towards Asmera and not to Gondar.”
Sbacchi thus confirms both the Tigrinya-speaking character of Wolkait and its economic orientation toward the Tigray-Eritrea sphere.
5. Economic and Political Dimensions
Donald N. Levine, in Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of a Multiethnic Society (1974), provides economic geography that reinforces this picture:
“To the regional market at Debre Tabor… people brought… cotton from the Tigrean district of Wolqait (eleven days).”
Levine’s identification of Wolqait as a “Tigrean district” reflects scholarly consensus on its regional affiliation.
Alemseged Abbay, in “Identity Jilted or Reimagining Identity? The Divergent Paths of the Eritrean and Tigrayan Nationalist Struggles,” documents how mid-twentieth-century political actors understood these territories. The Liberal Progressive Party (LPP), advocating for an independent “Tigray-Tigrignie” state, argued for:
“the annexation of the Tigray territory, including territory between the Taccazze river and the stream Ala, the territories of Tselemti, Ulcait and Zeghedie, the latters [the last three] being populations of Tigray origins.”
Here, Ulcait is explicitly identified as having “Tigray origins”, a claim made not by contemporary polemicists but by political actors in the 1940s seeking self-determination.
6. Conclusion: Center of Gravity vs. Fluid Margins
The evidence assembled here, spanning folk verses, ethnographic observation, linguistic scholarship, colonial records, economic geography, and political history, consistently supports a single conclusion: the predominant orientation of Welkait, demographically, linguistically, and in popular self-understanding, has long been Tigrayan/Tigrinya, with a distinct local character that does not negate that fundamental belonging.
Zola Moges’s portrait of “fluid identity” captures the margins, the bilingual minority, the cultural exchange, the Amharic understood by some, but obscures the center. The question is not whether “purely” Amhara or Tigrayan identity exists; such purity may be rare anywhere in Ethiopia. The question is whether “distinctive Tigrayan identity with local characteristics and some bilingualism” better captures the reality these sources reveal than Moges’s framing of irreducible fluidity.
The evidence suggests it does. Fluidity at the margins does not erase a clear center of gravity.
7. The Legal Omission: An Undefined Dispute
Beyond the empirical evidence, a more fundamental problem afflicts Zola’s analysis: he never defines the legal nature of the Welkait issue.
While he discusses legal mechanisms, the Constitution, referendums, Article 47(3), he never actually classifies what kind of legal dispute Welkait represents. Is this:
A. A border dispute between federal states? (under article 48)?
B. A self-determination claim by a “nation, nationality, or people”? (Under Article 39(3))?
C. An identity question (Under Article 39(5))?
The article never answers the threshold question: “Legally speaking, what is this dispute about?” Reading between the lines, the article implies certain legal characterizations without ever making them explicit. He does not examine whether the claim is brought by the right parties under the Constitution. He tells us what won’t work (referendum, force) and what might work (self-administration), but he never tells us, in legal terms, what the problem actually is.
8. The Undefined “Welkait People”
The article’s central concept, the very entity for whom self administration is proposed, remains critically undefined:
“Over generations, the Welkait people (ወልቃይቴዎች) have developed a distinct, locally rooted identity shaped by shared history, language, and lived experience, one that does not fit neatly into the binary frameworks imposed by regional politics.”
If their identity is “distinct” and “locally rooted,” then it is something, but the article never defines what that something is, except negatively (neither purely Amhara nor purely Tigrayan). The reader is left asking: What, positively, is a Welkait identity?
This omission becomes fatal when the article attempts to operationalize this category:
“Identifying who qualifies as being from Welkait may present some challenges, but these are not insurmountable. Criteria such as birth, long-term residence, and historical ties can be applied.”
This evades the central difficulty: The very same “fluid identity” that makes the Amhara/Tigray binary problematic also makes defining “Welkait people” problematic. If identities are fluid, then:
1. How many years constitute “long-term residence”?
2. What counts as “historical ties”?
3. How does one distinguish a “Welkait person” from a Tigrayan who has lived there for two generations?
4. What about Amharas who have lived there for three generations?
The article invokes a coherent community but provides no criteria for its boundaries, a crucial omission for any self-administration scheme.
9. The Referendum Contradiction
Perhaps the most striking internal contradiction concerns the referendum mechanism itself. The article states:
“The Welkait issue cannot be resolved through… a referendum.”
Yet later it argues:
“To formalize this, a referendum under Article 47(3) of the constitution offers the best path forward.”
The article explicitly argues that a referendum cannot work, comparing it to Western Sahara, noting parties cannot agree on voter eligibility, and stating neither side would accept defeat. Yet when proposing self-administration, the author suddenly embraces a referendum as “the best path forward.”
The contradiction is never resolved. If a binary referendum (Amhara vs. Tigray) is unworkable, why would a referendum on self administration be workable? The same obstacles.
The article asserts rather than demonstrates why this referendum would succeed where the other must fail.
10. The Constitutional Hurdle: Article 39(5) and Article 47(3)
Most fundamentally, Zola overlooks a threshold constitutional requirement. Under Article 39(5) of the FDRE Constitution, only a “Nation, Nationality or People”, defined as a community with a distinct identity, language, culture, and consciousness, can exercise the right to self-determination, including the right to form their own state under Article 47(3).
The article never establishes, indeed, never attempts to establish, that the Welkait people meet this constitutional definition. The very “fluid identity” thesis, which denies clear Amhara or Tigrayan categorization, cuts against establishing the kind of distinct, coherent, bounded identity that Article 39(5) requires.
If the Welkait people cannot be clearly distinguished from either Amhara or Tigrayan categories, on what basis can they claim status as a separate “Nation, Nationality or People” under the Constitution? The jurisdictional predicate for an Article 47(3) referendum has not been met. Moges proposes a remedy without establishing that his proposed beneficiary is entitled to it.
11. Until those questions are answered, the “Welkait model” remains not a solution, but a hope, and hopes, however noble, do not resolve quagmires.
Thanks. I was reading it.
The Legal Omission: An Undefined Dispute
Beyond the empirical evidence, a more fundamental problem afflicts Zola’s analysis: he never defines the legal nature of the Welkait issue.
While he discusses legal mechanisms, the Constitution, referendums, Article 47(3), he never actually classifies what kind of legal dispute Welkait represents. Is this:
A. A border dispute between federal states? (under article 48)?
B. A self-determination claim by a “nation, nationality, or people”? (Under Article 39(3))?
C. An identity question (Under Article 39(5))?
The article never answers the threshold question:
“Legally speaking, what is this dispute about?” Reading between the lines, the article implies certain legal characterizations without ever making them explicit. He does not examine whether the claim is brought by the right parties under the Constitution. He tells us what won’t work (referendum, force) and what might work (self-administration), but he never tells us, in legal terms, what the problem actually is.
I agree with the intention and generalization of the article. I would go further and want to say Ethiopia should abolish identity based politics. Otherwise, bloodshed will continue for the control of fertile lands and resourceful areas within a certain Ethnic based homeland.
A response to Manny. Identity based politics need not lead to bloodshed, unless that is the preferred solution of Amhara extremists so they can maintain political power and privilege inherited from Amhara kings Menilik and Haile Selassie.
That is a very shallow argument. The people of Amhara and Tigray are brothers (sisters). The 1960’s generation with its socialist ideology was the curse for the country. Otherwise, Ethiopian emperors may be much humane than most in their time. The formation of TPLF as a satellite organization for EPLF was the second defining moment for Ethiopia. Egypt then played its best to fracture the county. In this regard Egypt has been successful. Are we going to continue to be a playing card for them to disintegrate the county? There is no way wolkaite will be incorporated back in Tigray because a lot of damage had been done during TPLF rule.
Since Amhara is majority any form of state organization will work. But, I don’t want to see minorities like Tigray and other tribes to be politically undermined by the larger Amhara and Oromo tribes. Ethnic politics is divisive and gives advantage for larger communities. We don’t need any other example while we saw what happened to Tigrayans when TPLF is dethroned by Abyie.
It’s like collecting cow dung where the cow never stayed
Very well written and persuasively argued article. You’ve tackled the most intractable problem of the country with clarity and reason. Thank you very much.