Somalis fear constitutional reform could undermine their self-determination rights.
On 15 July, Ethiopia’s National Dialogue Conference opened in Addis Ababa, bringing together over 4,000 participants selected through a process the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission (ENDC) says reflects four years of consultations across more than 1,200 woredas.
For many in the Somali Region, however, the central question is not whether the Dialogue will succeed, but what exactly it is intended to produce.
If the process is ultimately used to renegotiate the constitutional order established in 1995, Somalis are likely to view it less as national reconciliation than as an attempt to revise the federal settlement without the participation of those who rely most heavily on its protections.
The Somali Region’s relationship with Ethiopian federalism has always been ambivalent.
On one hand, the federal system has failed to deliver many of the political and economic gains it promised. Political power remains concentrated in Addis Ababa, while regional governments exercise limited influence over national decision-making.
Discussions held in Jigjiga in 2025 reflected a widely shared perception that successive governments, under both the EPRDF and the Prosperity Party, have treated regional administrations as extensions of the center rather than autonomous political institutions.
Somalis remain underrepresented across federal institutions, including the judiciary, military, security services, and civil service. The appointment of Somali officials to senior federal positions has done little to alter this perception.
Economic indicators tell a similar story. Despite its strategic location and access to Ethiopia’s main corridor to the sea, the Somali Region continues to lag behind much of the country in infrastructure, electricity coverage, telecommunications, and educational investment. Pastoralist livelihoods, which sustain much of the population, have occupied a marginal place in national development planning.
These grievances have produced frustration with the practice of federalism without necessarily producing rejection of federalism itself.
For many Somalis, the problem lies not with the constitutional framework but with its implementation.
Articles 8, 39, and 41 of the 1995 constitution remain central to Somali political thinking because they provide guarantees of self-determination and place limits on central authority. In a political system dominated by larger demographic groups, constitutional protections are often viewed as the principal safeguard against political marginalization.
This helps explain growing concern over the National Dialogue’s “State Structure” agenda.
Although the Commission has not proposed specific constitutional amendments, many opposition figures and regional actors suspect that the process may be used to weaken ethnic federalism, dilute Article 39, or facilitate a transition toward a more centralized political system.
Those concerns have intensified following reports that Prosperity Party discussions in Adama earlier this month examined major constitutional changes, including regional restructuring, land privatization, territorial reorganization, and the introduction of a semi-presidential system.
Reports circulating within political circles suggest proposals that would divide the Somali Region into three constituent units, Oromia into six, and Amhara into four.
Whether such proposals ultimately materialize is almost secondary to their political effect. Their mere circulation has reinforced fears that constitutional reform may proceed before a national consensus exists on the future of the federation itself.
The National Dialogue was established in 2022 under Proclamation 1265/2021 to address disputes surrounding identity, state structure, and self-determination.
Yet questions about the process have persisted from the beginning.
The ONLF suspended its participation in October 2024 over disagreements concerning participant selection. Tigray remains absent from the process, while conflict continues to restrict participation across parts of Amhara and Oromia.
Critics also point to the overwhelming dominance of the Prosperity Party within parliament, which exercises oversight over the ENDC, as well as the absence of strong institutional guarantees of independence.
Language has become another source of criticism. Despite Ethiopia’s linguistic diversity, much of the Commission’s work has been conducted in Amharic, with limited accommodation for other major languages, including Somali.
None of these concerns automatically invalidate the Dialogue. They do, however, affect confidence in its ability to produce outcomes that are broadly accepted across Ethiopia’s political spectrum.
Part of the disagreement surrounding constitutional reform reflects different understandings of Ethiopia’s national question.
Many Ethiopian intellectuals trace contemporary debates over self-determination to student activism in the 1960s and the influence of Wallelign Mekonnen.
Somali political memory places those debates much earlier.
For many Somalis, the origins of the question lie in the incorporation of Somali territories into the Ethiopian state and in agreements that transferred the Haud and Ogaden without Somali participation or consent. The issue therefore predates post-imperial constitutional debates by decades.
This difference in historical perspective helps explain why constitutional guarantees of self-determination carry a significance in Somali politics that is not always fully appreciated elsewhere in Ethiopia.
The National Dialogue’s agenda on federal cities carries particular importance for the Somali Region because of Dire Dawa.
Unlike Addis Ababa, whose constitutional status is clearly defined, Dire Dawa remains under federal administration through arrangements originally intended to be temporary.
The Dialogue is expected to address questions surrounding the city’s legal status, governance arrangements, administrative boundaries, and resource-sharing mechanisms.
Given Dire Dawa’s economic importance and substantial Somali population, any changes to its status are likely to attract close scrutiny from Somali political actors.
For many in the region, the issue extends beyond municipal administration. It touches on representation, influence, and the broader balance of power within Ethiopia’s federal system.
The Somali Region’s demands are relatively modest: meaningful representation within federal institutions, equitable economic investment, respect for constitutional guarantees, and a genuine voice in decisions that affect the structure of the federation.
Whether the National Dialogue can provide those assurances remains uncertain.
If the process produces broad participation and a negotiated consensus, it could strengthen Ethiopia’s federal system and its legitimacy.
If constitutional restructuring proceeds without such consensus, many Somalis are likely to conclude that the federal compact can be revised whenever political conditions permit.
That conclusion would carry consequences well beyond the Somali Region.
The future of Ethiopian federalism may ultimately depend less on whether the National Dialogue reaches agreement than on whether its participants believe the rules of the federation apply equally to all.
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While this commentary contains the author’s opinions, Ethiopia Insight will correct factual errors.
Main photo: Members of the Ogaden Youth and Students Union (OYSU) celebrate the organization’s 16th anniversary in Kismayo, Somalia, on 26 June 2026. Source: ONLF X account.
Published under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International licence. You may not use the material for commercial purposes.
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all those compliners remained me . Donald J Trump phrase called 'Complaining, Complaining'
For those of You, please be Human and allowing people to live a peaceful life. The only beneficiary of Complaining is the complainer themselves.
"For many Somalis, the root of the issue lies in the historical incorporation of Somali territories into the Ethiopian state—specifically through agreements that transferred the Haud and Ogaden regions without Somali participation or consent."
But, was this lack of participation or consent unique to Somalis? No ethnic group in Ethiopia was consulted when the borders of modern Ethiopia were drawn. These colonial boundaries fragmented multiple groups, dividing not only Somalis into five distinct regions, but also impacting the Oromo, Afar, Nuer, Anuak, Benishangul, and many others. What distinguishes the Somali experience is our active attempt to dismantle these borders. Through the Somali Youth League (SYL) movement, we sought to unify the five divided Somali territories and establish a greater nation.
The consequences of that endeavor, however, were profound: it led to the collapse of our region's first promising republic and triggered an identity crisis that has long denied Somalis in Ethiopia and Kenya their rightful places in those nations' socio-economic and political spheres. As the third-largest and most resource-rich group in Ethiopia, the people of the Somali Regional State must demand and earn their rightful place in the Ethiopian landscape, rather than beg for it. Unfortunately, Somali elites—including my brother Muktar—have failed to work toward this strategic goal. Until this approach changes, Somalis will remain marginalized in Ethiopian politics.
I believed that was the main argument or advocacy in Muktar's article.
'' Reports circulating within political circles suggest proposals that would divide the Somali Region into three constituent units, Oromia into six, and Amhara into four.'' What about Tigray? That is why Tigray, its #tplf and 3TDF are resisting against such Malicious and dangerous intent to consolidate PP forever on the grave yard of the PPL like Tigray.
I would admire if current macro ethnic states are divided into smaller unities without integrating diferent ethnic groups.
Leaving aside its facade in search of a political healing, the National Dialogue has turned out to be inadequate and a travesty in one case. Tigray did not participate in the national dialogue, Tigray was excluded from the recent national elections, and it does not have representation in Parliament.
The irony is that the war in Tigray was one of the reasons the National Dialogue was formed. But Abiy the medemer man is unwilling to have a "dialogue" with TPLF for a political settlement, thus rendering the National Dialogue as an absurdity.
Ethiopian unity is not a contractual agreement among Ethiopian people.Ethiopian unity is deeply rooted in shard history, culture and centuries of coexistence rather than a mere political contract. But writers like Muktar manipulate narrative to serve their own interests.
as the current political systeam frames Ethiopia unity as a conditional legal agreement than an inherent reality.