Abiy’s War Script: Déjà Vu for Tigray, Ominous for Ethiopia

A chilling repeat of tactics used in the Tigray war signals that another devastating conflict may be in the making—unless the cycle is urgently broken.

In Ethiopia, history is not a relic. It is an active script, often rewritten but rarely reimagined. And Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed appears determined to direct a familiar and ruinous sequel.

His recent speech to Parliament, framed as a peace appeal to religious leaders, artists, and elders, was anything but conciliatory. Laced with subtle threats and calculated ambiguities, it bore a stark resemblance to the rhetoric that preceded the 2020–2022 war on Tigray—a conflict that left hundreds of thousands dead, industrial level looting, thousands raped, millions displaced, and a society in ruins. These are not peace-building measures; they are the early stages of siege and war, echoing the prelude to the 2020 conflict—which now seems dangerously imminent.

Echoes of Conflict

Abiy Ahmed’s carefully choreographed address came barely 100 days after the formation of the new Tigray Interim Regional Administration (TIRA). Yet even in this short span, the federal government has moved swiftly to isolate the region once more—blocking fuel supplies, severing transport routes, restricting journalists, and tightening diplomatic access. These are not the foundations of peace. They are the architecture of siege.

The strategy bears a striking resemblance to the months preceding the 2020 war. Once again, economic pressure is being applied through border closures and fuel blockades, strangling Tigray’s economy and undermining its political leadership.

Information is being tightly controlled, with access denied to independent media and foreign diplomats—ensuring that only the federal government’s version of events reaches the outside world. Even diplomacy has become performative: government-selected elders and emissaries are sent to Tigray, not to listen or mediate, but to present the illusion of dialogue while real channels remain closed.

These actions are not aimed at reconciliation. They are a reprise of tactics designed to coerce, dominate, and break the will of a region still reeling from the last war.

Pretoria Hollowed Out

The 2022 Pretoria Agreement, once a beacon of post-war hope, has been stripped of substance. Its core provisions—restoration of services, return of displaced communities, disarmament of non-state militias, DDR of Tigray forces, and meaningful political dialogue—remain unmet. Yet the delay in DDR—caused largely by resource constraints, as admitted by the federal government—has been selectively cast as the main spoiler, while federal non-compliance on all other fronts is routinely downplayed or ignored by both the media and the international community.

What is even more concerning is that, instead of honoring the agreement, the federal government has actively armed proxy forces like the Tekeze Zeb militia in Western Tigray and covertly backed disaffected Tigrayan insurgents in the Afar region—blatant escalations that run counter to the Pretoria Agreement. These are not isolated violations but calculated acts of destabilization, targeting Tigray and the TPLF, and amounting to a flagrant breach of both the letter and the spirit of the peace accord.

The TPLF’s—and Tigray’s—unraveling along internal fault lines, simmering under brutal economic and social pressures, has deepened the crisis. The removal of Getachew Reda from the presidency of TIRA, his controversial alliance with Abiy’s government, and the emergence of new political factions have created space for manipulation. The new TIRA, under General Tadesse Worede, faces the difficult task of asserting autonomy without inviting confrontation.

In its effort to avert renewed conflict, this new TIRA is bending over to accommodate nearly every federal demand—including tacitly allowing a rogue Southern Tigray zone leader to declare a ‘new region,’ much like the Tekeze Zeb militia has done in Western Tigray. These are dangerous precedents that risk splintering Tigray into three regions and accelerating its internal fragmentation.

The federal government is exploiting these divisions to weaken Tigray’s collective voice—marginalizing the TPLF, co-opting pliable actors, and sowing discord where unity is needed.

Eritrean Wildcard

Meanwhile, Eritrea continues to loom large. Its involvement in the previous war was marked by grave atrocities—mass killings, sexual violence, and widespread looting—making its likely role in any renewed conflict particularly alarming. Recent reports suggest the regime in Asmara is once again repositioning its forces, particularly along the Afar-Assab corridor, signaling a readiness to re-enter the fray should strategic conditions permit.

Ironically, the federal government’s increasingly suffocating measures against the TPLF are pushing it into a strategic corner, despite the TPLF’s repeated call for engagement and implementation of the COHA. Should war break out again, Tigray’s leadership may find itself with little choice but to turn to Eritrea, a historically hostile neighbour that now seems eager to exploit the vacuum.

Despite accusations by the federal government, there is, to date, no material evidence of a concrete alliance between the TPLF and Eritrea. In fact, the official statements unequivocally reject such accusations. What has occurred is a limited easing of hostilities and a normalization of cross-border contact between communities—steps that are lawful and, in fact, desirable under any post-conflict reconciliation framework.

Yet rather than responding with conciliatory measures—such as fulfilling its obligations under the Pretoria Agreement—the federal government appears more eager to provoke what it claims to fear: a TPLF-Eritrea alliance. Such a development would not only undermine Tigray’s long-term security and political coherence, but it would also destabilize Ethiopia as a whole, with ripple effects across the fragile Horn of Africa. Allowing Eritrea to exploit the cracks left by failed peace implementation is a strategic blunder Ethiopia can ill afford.

Wider Fallout

The consequences of another war would not stop at Tigray’s borders. The Amhara region, already destabilized by internal unrest and a heavy-handed federal crackdown, could again be drawn into conflict. Its armed groups once deployed to enforce demographic engineering in Western Tigray are now part of a volatile equation—poised to take sides should conflict reignite.

Nor will the Horn of Africa remain insulated. Ethiopia sits at the heart of a corridor linking the Red Sea to global trade. Renewed conflict would not only destabilize the region and jeopardize maritime security, but also risk drawing in fragile neighbors such as Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia—and even Egypt—through a web of overlapping interests and rivalries. As alliances harden along these lines, the danger of a localized conflict metastasizing into a broader regional confrontation grows significantly..

For international actors—the US, EU, and others—another Ethiopian war would undermine years of investment in regional stability. It would generate fresh waves of refugees, disrupt counterterrorism operations, and strain an already overloaded humanitarian system. The cost—in lives, resources, and strategic credibility—would be staggering.

Breaking the Cycle

What Ethiopia needs now is not another war, but a reckoning with political reality. The signs of impending conflict are too stark to dismiss. One might have hoped that the trauma of the last war—with its mass graves, famine, and the forced displacement of millions—would have served as a turning point. The devastation stretched far beyond Tigray, engulfing adjacent regions and hollowing out an already fragile economy. The war crimes committed, particularly in Tigray, left deep scars on the nation’s conscience—if not its leadership.

Yet rather than learning from this catastrophe, the federal government seems to have drawn the opposite conclusion: that the previous war failed not because it was wrong, but because it was incomplete. The lesson it appears to have taken is not restraint, but that its will was not exercised with enough force.

Now, instead of seeking a new path, it is retracing its old steps—only with greater ruthlessness, tighter coordination, and a chilling sense of purpose. The memory of the last war has not served as a deterrent. It has become a rehearsal script—refined, rehearsed, and ready for an encore.

To avert another disaster, a series of urgent steps must be taken—none more critical than the restoration of the TPLF’s legal status as a political party. The Pretoria Agreement, which remains the only viable roadmap to sustainable peace, is explicitly anchored in mutual recognition and a commitment to refrain from subversive actions that delegitimize the other party.

By revoking the TPLF’s legal status through procedural manoeuvres and technical entanglements, the federal government has not only sidelined a key actor in Tigray’s political landscape—it has undermined the spirit, if not the letter, of the agreement itself.

These tactics, while outwardly clever, are transparent to any serious observer. They reveal an intent not to implement peace, but to erode it from within—to weaken the co-signatory through bureaucratic sabotage while maintaining a façade of compliance.

If the Pretoria framework is to be more than a diplomatic placeholder, it must be upheld in both principle and practice. That begins with reversing the calculated exclusion of the TPLF and restoring a political balance built on genuine recognition, not legalistic traps.

Equally vital is the immediate removal of all restrictions imposed on Tigray. Fuel, transport, media access, and humanitarian aid must be fully restored. The continued imprisonment of Tigrayans based solely on their ethnic identity must end, and all government-sponsored militias, including the Tekeze Zeb and Tigrayan insurgents in Afar, must be disarmed.

Finally, Tigray must be politically reintegrated into Ethiopia’s federal system—not as a subordinate entity, but as a full participant with representation in Parliament and the national cabinet.

These measures are not political favors. They are the bare minimum requirements for building lasting peace. Anything less invites a return to conflict.

Global Responsibility

International oversight must be urgently re-established—this time with seriousness and resolve. The United States and its partners were instrumental in forging the Pretoria Agreement, helping bring two warring sides to the table and crafting a peace framework ambitious enough to end a brutal conflict.

Yet, in the critical months that followed, these same mediators have largely retreated to the sidelines, even as both parties have quietly deviated from the accord’s core commitments and engaged in subversive efforts to weaken and delegitimize each other.

It was clear from the outset that the success of Pretoria—its bold but necessary goals—depended entirely on the mediators doing more than brokering signatures. Sustained enforcement, backed by political pressure and, where necessary, coercive leverage, was essential to keep both parties in line. That leverage was never applied. And now, the result is a rapidly deteriorating situation, teetering on the edge of renewed war.

Though their inaction has already contributed to this dangerous slide, failing to act now would be worse. It would all but guarantee a return to conflict—one that, once unleashed, will be far harder to contain or reverse. This is a new challenge to the Trump Administration. The United States must resume its leadership through the Commission for the Implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA), not symbolically, but with real authority.

The United Nations, too, must be incentivized to take an assertive role—monitoring compliance, applying pressure, and ensuring that the agreement is not hollowed out by bad faith and indifference.

The international community cannot afford silence. Neutrality in the face of escalating aggression is not impartiality—it is complicity. If another war breaks out and the world watches idly, the consequences will be measured not only in ruined lives, but in global credibility.

Witnessing the last war was a tragedy. Allowing a second would be a crime. The script must change—before the curtain falls once more.

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While this commentary contains the author’s opinions, Ethiopia Insight will correct factual errors.

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