The Gedo Stratagem: Ethiopia’s High-Stakes Proxy Politics

Somalia’s Gedo region has become the nexus of proxy wars, clan rivalries, and Al-Shabaab resurgence, threatening to destabilize the entire Horn of Africa.

Straddling the tri-border area of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia, the Gedo region has become the epicenter of competing geopolitical ambitions in the Horn of Africa. Home to the Mareehaan clan and part of Jubaland’s administration, Gedo serves as both a vital trade corridor and a security flashpoint. Towns such as Beled-Hawo, Dollow, Luq, Garbaharey, and Bardera are coveted for their border crossings, smuggling routes, and military value.

Its strategic weight is amplified by its role as a conduit for Al-Shabaab’s cross-border operations, placing it squarely at the heart of both counterterrorism campaigns and regional power struggles.

Since Somalia adopted federalism in 2012, Gedo’s political volatility has surged. The Somali Federal Government’s (SFG) efforts to assert control have collided with Jubaland’s semi-autonomous ambitions, aspirations backed by Ethiopia and Kenya. For Addis Ababa, Gedo is a critical security buffer against both Al-Shabaab infiltration and potential Somali irredentist claims.

Nairobi likewise views the region as a bulwark against militant spillover into Kenya’s porous northeast. This convergence of interests has transformed Gedo into a proxy battleground where clan politics and regional strategies collide.

Federal Rift

By late 2024, relations between the SFG and Jubaland had sharply deteriorated over disputes surrounding electoral legitimacy and regional autonomy. At the core was the proposed shift from Somalia’s entrenched clan-based “4.5 formula”—conceived in 1997 and formalized at the 2000 Arta Peace Conference—to a universal suffrage model of one person, one vote.

The 4.5 formula is a power-sharing system that allocates a full share of parliamentary seats to each of Somalia’s four major clans, and a half-share collectively to a consortium of minority clans. This arrangement guarantees that majority clans—such as the Hawiye, Darod, Dir and Digil & Mirifle—retain a stronger voice than they would under a purely population-based electoral system.

Although the 2012 Provisional Constitution promised universal participation via a political party system, no tangible progress had been made in over a decade. Jubaland leaders feared that replacing it with universal suffrage would erode their representation and, by extension, weaken Jubaland’s influence and autonomy within Somalia’s federal framework.

In October 2024, Jubaland President Ahmed Madobe withdrew from National Consultative Council meetings, claiming universal suffrage threatened Jubaland’s autonomy.

Defying a two-term limit, Madobe staged a controversial re-election in November 2024. Mogadishu rejected the results, accusing him of overstaying his mandate, and deployed troops to Ras Kamboni in Lower Juba in an attempt to remove him from power. Federal forces were reportedly repelled by Jubaland troops, leading to their withdrawal from the area.

Ethiopian Leverage

Ethiopia’s involvement has further deepened the Gedo crisis. In early December 2024, amid escalating tensions over Somaliland’s port agreements, Ethiopian troops attacked Somali National Army (SNA) positions in Dollow, killing several soldiers. Later that month, relations appeared to thaw when Ethiopia and Somalia signed the Ankara Declaration, which included provisions for Ethiopian sea access through Somali territory.

The rapprochement proved short-lived: by mid-2025, talks collapsed after Ethiopia rejected Mogadishu’s proposal for joint port management, instead demanding sovereign control to establish a naval base, terms Somalia refused.

Since the breakdown, Ethiopia has intensified its military and logistical support for Jubaland forces, reinforcing its position along the Gedo frontier.

Simultaneously, Mogadishu, having failed to dislodge Jubaland’s influence in the Ras Kamboni area, shifted its focus to Gedo, targeting the border towns of Beled-Hawo and Dollow in an effort to weaken Jubaland’s leadership ahead of the 2026 national elections and disrupt Ethiopian support.

On 21 July, Mogadishu appointed the controversial Abdirashid “Janaan”—a former Jubaland security minister accused of serious human rights abuses—as Gedo’s regional intelligence chief. Six days later, SNA forces under Janaan’s command seized Beled-Hawo from Jubaland control, triggering fierce clashes and forcing thousands to flee into Ethiopia and Kenya.

That same day, a federal push to capture Dollow was repelled by Jubaland units, allegedly operating with Ethiopian coordination, who attacked a National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) camp, killing two federal soldiers. Ethiopia denied involvement, though local sources cited evidence of operational collaboration.

Subsequent reports indicate that on 2 August, Ethiopian officials met with Mareehaan elders in Dollow, demanding the SNA withdraw from Beled-Hawo, highlighting Ethiopia’s active role in local affairs, which could complicate Somali federal authority in the region.

Proxy Calculus

These clashes reveal Ethiopia’s sophisticated proxy strategy. By turning Jubaland’s forces into an extension of its border defense, Addis Ababa gains multiple advantages: a buffer zone against both Al-Shabaab and Somali nationalism, plausible deniability for direct intervention, and a steady erosion of Mogadishu’s authority in this vital frontier.

For the Somali government, the result is a lose-lose equation: asserting constitutional authority triggers Ethiopian resistance, while withdrawal effectively cedes territory to Ethiopian proxies. This “managed instability” has defined Gedo since Ethiopia’s 2006 intervention against the Islamic Courts Union, evolving from counterterrorism into a deliberate policy of political fragmentation.

Internal divisions within the Mareehaan clan, combined with fears of electoral manipulation, have expanded Ethiopia’s scope for influence in Gedo. Addis Ababa’s calculus is further shaped by reports of potential Egyptian troop deployments and allegations of Eritrean interference, developments that heighten its incentive to entrench its presence. While presenting its actions as a defense of Jubaland’s autonomy, Ethiopia is, in effect, eroding Somalia’s sovereignty.

Al-Shabaab Opportunism

The bitter paradox of Gedo’s conflict lies in its unintended consequences for regional security. While Somali federal forces, Jubaland troops, and Ethiopian units all claim to be fighting Al-Shabaab, their internecine clashes have created ideal conditions for the militant group to regroup and expand. Locked in a protracted power struggle, these factions have allowed Al-Shabaab to mount a steady and deliberate resurgence across southern Somalia.

In recent months, the militants have reasserted control over key villages along the Kenya–Somalia border, reinstating notorious taxation systems that yield millions annually from local trade and businesses. They have also exploited the security vacuum to infiltrate local governance, coercing village elders into “protection” agreements that grant them de facto administrative authority.

Their growing audacity was starkly demonstrated in July 2022, when they launched a cross-border assault that penetrated 150 kilometers into Ethiopian territory exposing serious vulnerabilities in regional defenses and delivering a psychological blow to forces tasked with containing them.

The current fighting between federal and Jubaland forces has derailed counterterrorism operations, enabling Al-Shabaab to tighten its grip on critical supply corridors linking Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya. Intelligence assessments indicate the group now holds more territory in southern Somalia than at any time since 2016, with its shadow governance network expanding daily.

This resurgence has unfolded despite the Somali government’s much-touted 2022 offensive, which initially achieved gains in central regions with the support of clan militias. The campaign faltered amid political infighting in Mogadishu, logistical breakdowns, and waning international backing. Al-Shabaab adapted quickly, surviving early losses before launching counteroffensives, most notably the August 2023 assault on Cowsweyne, which routed government forces from newly liberated areas.

Al-Shabaab’s ability to rebound from setbacks while its adversaries remain consumed by internal rivalries underscores a fundamental miscalculation in Somalia’s security strategy: the belief that the group can be defeated while the country’s political and military factions remain at odds.

Regional Fallout

The Gedo conflict risks spiraling into a broader Horn of Africa crisis. Kenya has fortified its Mandera border with additional troops and surveillance, wary of refugee inflows and militant infiltration. While Kenya and Ethiopia maintain a security pact, Ethiopian-backed Jubaland offensives could push militants into Kenyan territory, straining relations.

For Ethiopia, Gedo’s turmoil comes amid multiple domestic conflicts and the looming threat of renewed war with Eritrea, stretching its military bandwidth. Egyptian involvement through AU and bilateral deployments in Somalia adds a combustible new dimension, tied to Cairo’s broader rivalry with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

Middle Eastern rivalries compound the problem: the UAE’s deep investments in Jubaland, Puntland, and Somaliland clash with Turkey’s strategic partnership with Mogadishu, creating competing power structures and further fragmenting Somalia’s cohesion.

Gedo’s destabilization is not a localized crisis; it is rather a regional flashpoint. Preventing further escalation demands urgent action: neutral AU/UN peacekeepers should replace partisan troops, inclusive governance must balance federal authority with local interests, and IGAD-led cooperation should target both security gaps and Al-Shabaab’s financing.

Without decisive intervention, the Horn risks being pulled into a protracted, multi-front conflict, one where Gedo remains both the prize and the powder keg.

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While this commentary contains the author’s opinions, Ethiopia Insight will correct factual errors.

Main photo: Al-Shabaab fighters in the central square of Mahas, 13 August 2025. Source: Somalia Front News.

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1. Since this piece was submitted, new reports have emerged indicating that Mahas has fallen to Al-Shabaab forces. ↩︎