Weapons of Discord

How the lifting of Somalia’s arms embargo is reshaping security in the Horn of Africa

When the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2714 in December 2023, fully lifting Somalia’s long-standing arms embargo, the move was widely hailed in Mogadishu as a milestone for sovereignty and national dignity.

Nearly two years later, however, the situation remains fragile. Mogadishu’s ability to exercise authority across the country is uneven, and questions have emerged about whether newly acquired weaponry is reinforcing security or exacerbating internal rivalries.

Federal tensions, the diversion of arms, and the risks posed to regional stability have all begun to complicate what was initially hailed as a clear-cut victory.

The lifting of the embargo, then, is less a story of unambiguous success than a lens through which to examine Somalia’s persistent governance challenges, the fragility of its federal system, and the potential for both domestic and regional repercussions.

Fragile Authority

Despite international support, the Federal Government of Somalia continues to struggle to assert consistent authority across the country, including in parts of Mogadishu itself. Much of the countryside remains under the influence of Al-Shabaab, while other areas are controlled by clan militias or Federal Member State (FMS) forces operating autonomously.

These realities have cast doubt on assumptions that Mogadishu could reliably regulate arms flows. In practice, newly acquired weaponry has in some cases been diverted to political rivalries, inter-clan conflict, or even terrorist networks, rather than being deployed primarily against Al-Shabaab.

Observers warn that Somalia’s fragile federal system is under strain, as Mogadishu has at times deployed new military capabilities in confrontations with regional forces rather than exclusively against terrorist threats. In December 2024, drone strikes targeting Jubaland forces in Ras Kamboni reportedly prompted mass surrenders. In April 2025, a Turkish-supplied Bayraktar TB2 drone strike killed 17 civilians in Galmudug during clan clashes.

These incidents highlight the risk that new weaponry is being employed in politically fraught contexts, raising concerns about priorities in Somalia’s security strategy.

Federal Strains

Beyond military measures, Mogadishu has also been accused of leveraging financial flows for political ends. Reports suggest that federal revenue shares to Puntland were withheld for six months in 2024, a move critics say weakened Puntland’s counterterrorism capacity against Daesh/ISIS-Somalia. The Supreme Court’s March 2024 nullification of South West State’s elections added to tensions, fueling perceptions of erosion in constitutional federalism.

Alongside these disputes, an even more troubling development has emerged: the leakage of government-issued arms into the hands of Al-Shabaab. A May 2025 report by the UN Panel of Experts documented at least 17 such cases since the embargo was lifted. Turkish-made MKEK rifles have even appeared in Al-Shabaab propaganda videos.

The Hiraal Institute also reported a 40% surge in Improvised Explosive Devices [IED] attacks in Hirshabelle over the same period. Analysts have drawn parallels between the deployment of Bayraktar drones in Somalia and earlier controversial transfers to Libya documented by UN experts in 2023.

Regional Ripples

The flow of arms into the region has been marked by repeated instances of illicit diversion and questionable end-use. Somaliland authorities reported seizing three illicit Turkish arms shipments at Berbera Port in 2024. In July 2025, Puntland Maritime Police intercepted the MV Yasin, a Turkish vessel allegedly smuggling heavy weaponry disguised as agricultural equipment. Separately, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) noted a 300% increase in Turkish arms exports to Somalia between 2014–2018 and 2019–2023, some of which have reportedly surfaced in Al-Shabaab raids.

These developments have raised alarm across neighboring states—including, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti—who fear that unaccounted-for shipments could be diverted to terrorist groups or clan militias. Particularly in the contested Sool and Sanaag regions, such inflows risk intensifying local conflicts with potential spillover effects for the wider Horn of Africa.

Critics argue that the international community’s “single-gatekeeper” approach—channeling assistance primarily through Mogadishu—has fallen short. Weapons intended to bolster the fight against Al-Shabaab have in some cases ended up arming the very group they were meant to counter. Some analysts see echoes of the excessive centralization that preceded Somalia’s state collapse in 1991.

Monitoring Paramount

To prevent further deterioration, it is recommend that the UNSC consider re-introducing conditional arms controls, including robust UN-monitored end-use checks. International partners should also consider engaging more directly with federal member states and to enforce UNSCR 2662 targeted sanctions against any entities—including Turkish or UAE actors—found in violation of end-use agreements.

Rather than a straightforward sovereign victory, the lifting of Somalia’s arms embargo has emerged as a mixed development, offering opportunities for national defense but also significant risks. Without corrective measures, there is a danger that Somalia’s fragile federal structure could unravel further, and that Al-Shabaab might evolve into a more conventionally armed force.

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