Viewpoint

Ethiopia’s Tigray Must Rebuild Before It Considers Breaking Away

True sovereignty demands reform, not resentment—and patience, not panic

The recent exchange between Abrar Fitwi and Mulugeta Gebregziabher—initiated by Abrar’s piece and followed by Mulugeta’s rebuttal—has resonated with many of us who hold Tigray’s legacy dear. At the heart of their dialogue lies a crucial question: must democracy precede secession?

Mulugeta argues that nationhood lays the foundation for democracy. But this perspective risks underestimating the fragility of Tigray’s present condition. In moments of upheaval, sequence matters. And history alone cannot substitute for the difficult, often painstaking work of rebuilding trust, institutions, and consensus.

Tigray occupies a central position in the historical formation of Ethiopia, having played a formative role in the state’s earliest development. From the ancient Kingdom of Aksum, which shaped both Ethiopia’s Orthodox tradition and the early history of Islam through the first Hijra, to its central role in modern national identity, the region’s imprint is foundational. To sever ties hastily would be to walk away from a legacy that is as much Tigray’s as it is Ethiopia’s.

Yet, the demand for self-determination is not unwarranted. Tigray’s people have endured war, displacement, and marginalization. The pursuit of genuine liberation is not achieved through abrupt, reactionary separation; it requires a deliberate progression toward justice, healing, and democratic renewal. Secession undertaken hastily, without a democratic mandate or the requisite civic institutions, cannot be regarded as an authentic realization of freedom.

Fragile Rebuilding

The 2020–22 war shattered Tigray. Infrastructure was obliterated. Families torn apart. The very social fabric frayed. The current reality is that of a post-conflict society struggling for stability, rather than a fully formed nation-state prepared for autonomous emergence

Calls for immediate independence, however understandable, must confront this reality. As Abrar cautions, independence without civil liberties is like “starting a new nation in a prison.” Eritrea and South Sudan offer sobering examples: nations born of struggle but scarred by authoritarian relapse, instability, and betrayal of their founding hopes.

Tigray risks becoming another cautionary tale if its leaders and elites mistake emotional momentum for institutional readiness. True sovereignty cannot be built atop rubble, nor can it be willed into existence by hashtags and hardliners.

Mulugeta’s retort that “nationhood is the foundation for democracy, not its reward” may resonate in theory. But theory does not govern post-war societies. Practice does. And the practice of democratic institution-building is exactly what Tigray needs now—before any declarations of statehood.

Tigray is plagued by internal rivalries and deep societal wounds. These matters are not peripheral concerns to be deferred until after the attainment of independence; they are foundational questions that require immediate and thorough deliberation. No movement for national liberation can endure if it cannot even agree on who represents it, or whose voice truly matters.

To borrow from political scientist Michael Keating: “Secession is not just the right to leave—it is the responsibility to govern.” Without a credible democratic framework, any push for independence will ring hollow. Worse, it could entrench new forms of oppression under the guise of national pride.

Dangerous Alliances

The geopolitical landscape is unforgiving. The Ethiopia-Eritrea border remains volatile. Reports of new alignments between the TPLF and Eritrea—its former adversary—signal desperation, not strategy. Such alliances may promise tactical leverage, but they come at a profound cost: legitimacy, stability, and long-term peace.

A miscalculated tilt toward Asmara risks reigniting old wars, turning Tigray into a battleground once again—this time in a proxy conflict between regional powers. Egypt’s friction with Ethiopia over the GERD adds yet another layer of complexity. The Horn is no place for reckless posturing.

Meanwhile, internal divisions persist. The Pretoria Agreement is fraying. Parts of Tigray remain under the control of external armed actors. These unresolved issues render any unilateral declaration of independence both imprudent and unsustainable. The international community, ever cautious, will not embrace a fragile, contested new state in a region already drowning in instability.

The experience of post-conflict societies elsewhere underscores this point. The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, shows how rushing to political partition without first establishing a unified, multi-ethnic democratic framework can entrench political deadlock and instability. Through the Dayton Agreement, the international community prioritized a complex institutional structure to foster consensus, recognizing that lasting peace depends on shared governance.

Tigray must do the same. Build first. Decide later. Democracy should not be construed as an externally imposed Western model; rather, it functions as a critical mechanism for survival and cohesion in societies marked by deep internal divisions. No flag, no anthem, no formal boundary can substitute for the trust of the people. That must be earned, not assumed.

Strategic Renewal

The path ahead for Tigray requires three pillars: healing, reform, and diplomacy.

The region must first address the enduring psychological and social consequences of conflict. Trauma manifests within familial relations, collective memory, and patterns of mistrust. A sustainable political future requires its recognition and redress through mechanisms of truth-telling, justice, and reconciliation.

Second, inclusive governance must become the cornerstone of regional life. This means rebuilding institutions, holding free and fair elections, and empowering a new generation through education and economic opportunity. The silence of the moderate majority must be broken, and civic voices must be protected from intimidation and manipulation.

Third, engagement with the federal government must be strategic, not submissive. Tigray must assert its interests, but without the fatalism or fury that now fuels extremist rhetoric. Diplomacy, not defiance, will pave the road to lasting autonomy—whether within Ethiopia or beyond it.

The federal government has a role to play. More than that, it carries a moral and constitutional obligation. It must move beyond ceasefires and symbolism. What is needed now is tangible reconstruction, clear resolution of territorial questions, and a sincere commitment to reconciliation that replaces mistrust with trust.

The international community, too, must remain present. Continued engagement is essential, not only to prevent a return to war but to help nurture democratic growth. Conditional aid, diplomatic pressure, and civil society support remain crucial.

Most importantly, external actors must pay attention to the full range of Tigrayan voices, not just the loudest ones echoing through social media.

Not Yet

Tigray’s right to self-determination must never be dismissed. But neither should it be misused by political entrepreneurs and wounded factions seeking premature escape from a painful present. Independence, if it comes, must emerge from deliberate strategy, democratic will, and internal strength. It cannot be the result of rage or despair.

The alternative is not surrender but the slow, deliberate work of building: institutions, trust, and a future that honors the region’s history without being bound by it. That future demands patience, discipline, and vision.

Tigray is not simply a casualty of recent wars. It holds a legacy that still resonates, not just in Ethiopia, but across the Horn of Africa. Slogans won’t protect that legacy. Wisdom will. So will time.

Query or correction? Email us

While this commentary contains the author’s opinions, Ethiopia Insight will correct factual errors.

Main photo: Eritrean soldiers observe a moment of silence for fallen comrades in Axum, Tigray — November 2022. Source: Hidmona TV.

Published under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International licence. You may not use the material for commercial purposes.

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About the author

Mohammedawel Hagos

Mohammedawel is a lecturer at Worabe University and a doctoral candidate whose research focuses on the dynamics of ethnic, religious, and national identities in Ethiopia, with a particular emphasis on Tigray.

9 Comments

  • Main photo (under the title of the article), Eritrean soldiers standing in a moment of silence for their fallen comrades. However, it can also be seen as a pretext for a photo op by Eritrean soldiers to stand in front of Axum’s iconic symbol of antiquity. If a moment of silence is an act of remembrance, then that photo is also a reminder of Eritrean soldiers and the killings they committed, which would require an atonement.

  • It’s sad to read arguments and counter arguments of elite Tegaru; attempting to impose their will on the sincere and incent people of Tigray from their comfortable bed in diaspora!!!
    Shame on you!

  • In matters of geography and political circumstances, Tigray is trapped between Ethiopia and Eritrea in an existential dilemma. Pretoria agreement is a facade; it is obvious Abiy does not have the goodwill towards Tigray to implement the peace plan. He is trying to use the electoral board to disband TPLF. After the Amharas carried out ethnic cleansing, Abiy shows no inclination to return displaced Tigray people back to their homes in western and south Tigray.

    Tigray secession is unrealistic. And looking towards Eritrea for relief is not a workable solution. So, what is to be done? Abiy and the Amharas have developed an entrenched and endless animosity towards TPLF. For the sake of Tigray, perhaps it is time to retire the name TPLF and let others form a viable party. TPLF was originally formed to defend Tigray, and it will always remain in the hearts and minds of Tigray people.

    It’s unlikely the Amharas will ever agree to the return of displaced Tigray people to their homes, and it is equally unlikely Abiy will force the issue on the Amharas. The other option is a settlement project in Tigray for the displaced people to start a new life. This requires a large program and funding only the federal government and perhaps the IMF/World Bank can provide. This also depends on whether Abiy is willing to accept the political and moral responsibility for such a project to rebuild Tigray.

  • This is a piece of wise counsel that is hard to find in our present political atmosphere. Even though I do not see the logic of Tigrean secession, I firmly believe that a frank, open, and consequential democratic debate must take place among the various Tigrean parties and factions before making the drastic decision of opting for a separate statehood. One needs to look at South Sudan and Eritrea before rushing to the secession close, as the author himself advises.

  • Urging the Tigrayan people to exhibit “patience, discipline, and vision” in the aftermath of a horrific genocide is, at best, tone-deaf and, at worst, deeply disrespectful.

    First, I want to thank Mohammedawel for engaging with the article by Abrar and my rejoinder. However, his response misrepresents my position by selectively quoting phrases rather than addressing the full scope of my argument.

    In my rejoinder, I clearly stated that no nation was born democratic; democracy is not a prerequisite for sovereignty but a process that unfolds within it. Modern nation-states, be it the United States, France, India, Ghana, or others emerged through struggle, often violent and exclusionary, and only later developed democratic institutions through internal contestation, reform, and civic engagement.

    In my rejoinder, I clearly argue that to demand a stateless people first construct a democratic utopia before claiming independence is to impose an impossible standard, one that no existing nation has ever met. Sovereignty is not a luxury; it is a necessary tool for building democracy.

    While both Abrar and now Mohammedawel warn that “independence without democracy leads to tyranny,” citing Eritrea and South Sudan, I have argued that this diagnosis misses the mark. I further elaborate that the issue in those cases was not independence itself, but the failure to build inclusive institutions afterward, which Mohammedawel presents as if I failed to recognize this.

    My argument in my rejoinder draws from these lessons: sovereignty should not be delayed but embraced as the foundation upon which democratic structures are built, without sovereignty, people can neither shape their own political future nor draft their own constitution, hold their leaders accountable, or safeguard their rights through institutions they own.

    It is unclear why Mohammedawel insists that “Tigray’s right to self-determination must never be dismissed.” Neither Abrar nor I dismiss this right. It is enshrined in the Ethiopian constitution and paid for with the blood of thousands of Tigrayan youth.
    Mohammedawel’s assertion that self-determination is being misused by “political entrepreneurs and wounded factions seeking premature escape from a painful present” is a mischaracterization of the forces that have sacrificed dearly to secure it. It is offensive at best and contemptuous at worst to the Tigray people.

    Moreover, the conflation of self-determination and independence is something Mohammedawel must carefully reconsider. His assertion that self-determination “cannot be the result of rage or despair” overlooks the profound sacrifices and the widespread support for this cause.

    If Mohammedawel genuinely read my rejoinder, I have described self-determination as NOT merely a reaction but as a prelude to independence, which requires not only vision and discipline but also immense sacrifice, something the Tigrayan people have already demonstrated over half a century.

    To ask them now for more “patience, discipline, and vision” after enduring genocide is not just misguided—it is offensive. Please re-read my rejoinder!!

    • Dear Dr. Mulugeta,

      Thank you for your detailed response. While I appreciate the passion behind your points, our disagreement appears to stem from a fundamental difference in strategic philosophy. You frame this as a debate between an academic ideal of nationhood and the hard reality of Tigray’s suffering. I contend, however, that it is precisely the hard reality of Tigray that makes your position so precarious.

      My commentary was in no way an attempt to “tone-deaf” or “disrespect” the immense sacrifices of the Tigrayan people. In fact, I believe it is a far greater disrespect to demand that a people who have endured such profound trauma plunge headfirst into a hasty, ill-prepared, and potentially catastrophic secession. My call for patience, discipline, and vision is not a plea for passivity; it is a demand for the strategic foresight necessary to ensure that the monumental sacrifices made were not in vain.

      Your argument that “sovereignty is the foundation for democracy” is a dangerous oversimplification of Tigray’s reality. While it may hold up in abstract theory, the real-world examples you cite—Eritrea and South Sudan—serve as powerful counterarguments to your position. Their post-independence failures were not simply a matter of neglecting institution-building after statehood; they were a direct result of a lack of democratic consensus and internal legitimacy before the declaration of independence. These were not nascent democracies in the making; they were nations born from flawed processes, and their subsequent tyrannies were a natural consequence of that weak foundation.

      The right to self-determination is a constitutional guarantee, but its expression must not be a reaction to trauma, but a deliberate and principled decision rooted in genuine internal consensus.

      The current reality in Tigray is one of profound fragility. The devastating conflict left not a unified nation, but a society plagued by deep internal divisions and political factions that lack broad consensus. As of mid-2025, the Pretoria Peace Agreement is stalled, with key issues like the withdrawal of Eritrean forces and the status of the Western Tigray zone unresolved. Furthermore, reports of infighting within the Tigrayan leadership itself, and attempts to form new alliances with former adversaries like Eritrea, are a testament to this instability.

      My question is not whether Tigray deserves to be a nation, but rather, Is Tigray ready for such? A nation built on factionalism, unresolved territorial disputes, and regional instability is not a beacon of hope; it is a recipe for renewed conflict. The idea of a new state being built on such a fractured foundation is not an expression of sovereignty—it is a surrender to chaos.

      Finally, you seem to interpret my emphasis on Tigray’s historical connection to Ethiopia as a denial of its right to self-determination. On the contrary, I see it as a central pillar of my argument. Tigray is a foundational cradle of Ethiopian civilization. Its rich history and legacy are intertwined with the broader national narrative. A hasty secession would not preserve this legacy; it would shatter it.

      The responsible path forward is to build a democratic, strong, and stable Tigray that can stand on a firm and legitimate foundation, whether within Ethiopia or as an independent state. A hasty decision is not wise. It is a desperate gamble that risks everything for an uncertain future. Is a fragile, new state—born of trauma and internal division—truly the honorable reward for all that has been sacrificed? I believe the answer is a resounding no.

  • Thank you brother @Mohammedawel, for this powerful and thoughtful article. Your analysis of the complex issues facing Tigray, from the urgency of rebuilding to the political and historical context, is both insightful and necessary.

    I appreciate how you navigate the difficult question of secession versus reform, avoiding simplistic answers and instead emphasizing the importance of a deliberate, patient, and democratic approach.

    With that in mind, I would like to raise a few key points of disagreement and highlight certain aspects separately.

    The provided text, a commentary on the political situation in Tigray, presents a specific perspective rather than a collection of factual errors. Therefore, it is more appropriate to analyze its core arguments and identify potential weaknesses or areas where different viewpoints might exist, rather than labeling them as “incorrect.”

    Critiques on Key Viewpoints

    You strongly assert that democracy must precede secession, framing democracy as a prerequisite for legitimate nationhood. A key critique of this view is that it might present a false dichotomy. In my opinion, a nation’s (including Tegaru’s) struggle for self-determination and the establishment of a democratic state are not sequential but rather parallel and mutually reinforcing processes.

    For a people who feel marginalized and oppressed, the act of seeking independence itself can be a powerful democratizing force, uniting different factions under a common goal and fostering a sense of shared political destiny. Your argument risks being seen as a form of “gatekeeping” on sovereignty, suggesting that Tigrayans must meet an external standard of democratic maturity before they can exercise their right to self-determination.

    You acknowledge the pain and suffering of the Tigray people but seem to frame the desire for secession as an “emotional momentum” driven by “rage or despair.” This perspective could be seen as minimizing the deep-seated grievances that fuel the independence movement.

    As you know, the war was not just a conflict; it was, for many, a genocidal assault on their identity and existence. From this perspective, the desire to separate is not an emotional overreaction but a rational response to what they perceive as a fundamental failure of the Ethiopian federal system to protect them.

    Your focus on “healing” and “reconciliation” with the federal government might be viewed by some as an unreasonable demand, given the scale of the atrocities and the lack of accountability.

    You dismiss potential alliances with Eritrea as “desperation, not strategy” and warn against “reckless posturing.” While the risks are real, this view may oversimplify the complex geopolitical landscape. For a region facing existential threats, any potential alliance—even with a former adversary—can be a calculated strategic move.

    In a volatile region like the Horn of Africa, where external powers often play a role, a small and fragile state like Tigray might feel it has little choice but to seek out unconventional partners to ensure its survival. Your critique of this strategy, while valid in its concern for long-term stability, may not fully appreciate the short-term pressures and sense of strategic necessity felt by Tigray (TPLF) leaders.

    My Alternative Perspectives

    Your article presents a view that is cautious and prioritizes stability, internal reform, and diplomacy. A strong alternative view, based on a different interpretation of the same facts, would be one that prioritizes self-determination and the immediate political agency of the Tigray people.

    This perspective would argue that:

    The act of declaring independence would not be an escape from a painful present but a decisive step toward building a future on their own terms. Secession would give the Tigray people full control over their resources, their military, and their political future, allowing them to rebuild their society without the interference or security threats posed by the federal government or other regional actors.

    In this view, they cannot genuinely rebuild institutions or foster true democracy while still under the political control of the very system they believe failed to protect them.

    Based on your own description of the war and its aftermath, this perspective would argue that the existing federal structure is fundamentally broken.

    The “Pretoria Agreement is fraying,” and “parts of Tigray remain under the control of external armed actors.” From this viewpoint, these are not temporary challenges to be managed but fundamental flaws that demonstrate the impossibility of a shared future. Continuing to negotiate within a failed framework is seen as a waste of time and an ongoing risk to the security of the Tigray people.

    The alternative view would see alliances, even with former foes like Eritrea, not as desperate acts but as pragmatic and necessary for a small, landlocked region surrounded by hostile or indifferent neighbors. A newly independent Tigray would need strong security guarantees and access to the sea.

    Strategic alliances with any willing partner, regardless of their past, would be framed as a matter of survival, not just tactical leverage. This perspective would argue that relying on the “international community” for protection is a naïve and dangerous gamble.

    In Conclusion, while you advocate for a slow, patient, and reform-oriented path, my argument is for a decisive, sovereignty-focused path, seeing it as the only way to guarantee the safety and future of the Tigray people in a hostile geopolitical environment.

    Both views rely on an interpretation of the same events, but they prioritize different values, one values stability and institutional reform first, while the other values self-determination and immediate political agency.

    • Hanan F, thank you for your insightful critique. I deeply appreciate your willingness to engage with my viewpoint on such a critical matter. While we agree this is a debate about strategic priorities, I remain steadfast in my belief that long-term viability and the true exercise of Tigray’s political destiny depend on the patient work of internal reform first.

      My call for patience, discipline, and vision is not a plea for passivity; it is a demand for the strategic foresight necessary to ensure that the monumental sacrifices of the Tigrayan people were not in vain.

      You argue that democracy and a nation’s struggle are parallel processes, but the history of Tigray’s neighbors provides a powerful counter-argument. Nations born from a struggle for independence without a pre-existing democratic consensus have descended into authoritarianism and civil war. A nation’s founding must not be a reaction to trauma; it must be a deliberate and principled decision rooted in genuine internal consensus.

      A hasty move toward independence risks creating a fragile new state. Tigray is a foundational pillar of Ethiopian history, and its rich legacy is inseparable from the broader national narrative. To choose secession at this moment, with the region plagued by internal divisions and lacking a unified popular mandate, would be a disastrous gamble. My question is not whether Tigray deserves to determine its future, but rather, Is Tigray ready for such? A hasty decision is not wise. It is a desperate gamble that risks everything for an uncertain future. Is a fragile, new state—born of trauma and internal division—truly the honorable reward for all that has been sacrificed? I believe the answer is a resounding no.

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